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Over the past decade, the number of security breaches that have com-
promised business records containing the personal information of millions of
American consumers has soared. The legal world has largely responded in a
traditional fashion: by rushing to the courthouse seeking damages for vari-
ous alleged injuries from the same businesses that had their computers and
networks breached by criminal hackers. Corporate misconduct is a classic
justification for expending societal resources to hold a company accountable
and deter other companies from engaging in similar, harmful conduct. How-
ever, company data on consumers and clients may be compromised in situa-
tions involving no corporate misconduct. In fact, in many situations the
hacker is the primary culprit. The theft of personal information causes mini-
mal harm to consumers, while the business-the putative defendant-suffers
far greater costs associated with a breach. Prevention is costly and difficult,
and predicting which companies will be hacked, as well as the means by
which it will occur, is next to impossible. For these and other reasons, it may
be time to consider a data victims' compensation fund in lieu of private civil
litigation. This fund would provide a more efficient and effective mechanism
for identifying and exacting financial penalties from only the truly "bad ap-
ples "-companies that significantly fail to employ reasonable measures to
secure data. Additionally, the fund would provide prompt and fair compensa-
tion to individuals harmed by a data breach.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, The Washington Post published a story announcing a data se-
curity breach.' A few "home computer buffs" stole confidential credit histo-
ries from computers belonging to TRW Information Services, a credit
bureau; access was obtained through a Sears Roebuck store that used TRW's
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1. Phillip J. Hilts, Computer Raiders Hit Big Credit File, WASH. POST (Jun. 22,
1984), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/06/22/computer-
raiders-hit-big-credit-file/d358 I cf9-8301-4a99-bae8-9c 1 742da7d 19/.
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services. 2 The thieves gained access to the credit histories of an estimated 90
million Americans, "secured" only by a username and password.3 The
thieves later posted the stolen information on a publicly available Internet
board.4 Although industry analysts surmised that TRW should have readily
detected the security breach, company officials were not advised of the
breach until a year after its occurrence.5 The costs incurred by TRW as a
result of the breach are unknown.6 But a search of all reported federal and
state cases from the ten-year period following the breach revealed that not
even one consumer sued TRW for the unauthorized access of their credit
history.7
Much has changed since that TRW breach. In today's cyber world, pro-
fessional hackers, not "home computer buffs," are the principal culprits, and
they use sophisticated technology to access data and sell information on the
black market.8 Congress and states have enacted legislation designed to en-
sure consumer privacy and protect personal information stored in company






7. A search of all reported federal and state cases for the ten-year period follow-
ing the breach reveals no indication of any filing. As stated elsewhere, in an-
other context, the "first wave" of data security breach lawsuits ensued many
years later. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent
Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1556 (2005) (ex-
plaining that the "first wave of computer security lawsuits" ensued many years
later in another context).
8. See discussion infra Part II.A.
9. See generally Dana Rosenfeld & Donnelly McDowell, Moving Target: Protect-
ing Against Data Breaches Now and Down the Road, 28 ANTITRUST 90, 90-93
(2014) (providing an overview of enforcement actions brought by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), as well as applicable federal and state laws); Sarah
Jane Hughes, Payments Data Security Breaches and Oil Spills: What Lessons
Can Payments Security Learn from the Laws Governing Remediation of the
Exxon Valdez, Deepwater Horizon, and Other Oil Spills?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 111, 134-44 (2010) (discussing federal and state legislation, as
well as proposed bills); J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or
Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 109, 109 (2008) (cautioning regulators, like the FTC, against restricting
the exchange of commercial information); Raymond G. Mullady, Jr. & Scott D.
Hansen, Identity Theft Litigation: A Roadmap for Defense and Protection, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 563, 570-88 (2008) (giving a detailed discussion of reactions to
identity theft from both the legislature and judiciary).
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have spent billions of dollars on data security software and systems;' and a
sizeable "cottage industry" selling personal information security services di-
rectly to consumers has emerged.12 All but three states, and the District of
Columbia, have enacted statutes requiring companies to notify persons
whose confidential personal information has been breached.1 3 Data breaches
regularly make headline news stories.14
The stories of data breaches should come as no surprise. Most consum-
ers frequently swipe their credit and debit cards, and personal information is
regularly exchanged on websites like Facebook and eBay.15 Customers ac-
cess their retirement accounts and credit reports online and use online bill
payment services which house social security numbers, credit card numbers,
and account information.1 6 We live in the "big data" world of interconnected
digital information. While this world is convenient, the numerous threats as-
10. See, e.g., Title XII (Health Information Technology for Economic & Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (requiring entities covered by the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26,
29, and 42 U.S.C.), to give notice in the event of a security breach); Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 17, §§ 17.03-.04 (2011) (requiring companies to implement a "writ-
ten, comprehensive information security program" and encrypt any personal
information that is stored on portable devices and transmitted either wirelessly
or over public networks).
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.
12. See, e.g., How LifeLock Works, LIFELOCK, https://www.lifelock.com/how-it-
works/overview/ (last visited Jun. 2, 2016) (providing an example of a com-
pany that sells personal information security services directly to consumers).
13. See Rachael M. Peters, So You've Been Notified, Now What? The Problem with
Current Data Breach Notification Laws, 56 ARIz. L. REV. 1171, 1181 (2014);
Security Breach Notification Chart, PERKINS COlE (Jan. 2016), https://
www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/security-breach-notification-chart.html
(providing a list of states that have laws requiring notification to consumers or
clients in the event of breach).
14. See, e.g., Hackers Stole Social Security Numbers From 21.5 Million People In
Recent Data Breach, U.S. Says, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2015, 3:53 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/09/social-security-data-breach-n77
64812.html (reporting on yet another data breach in the United States).
15. See Josh Keller et al., How Many Times Has Your Personal Information Been
Exposed to Hackers?, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/in
teractive/2015/07/29/technology/personaltech/what-parts-of-your-information-
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sociated with "big data" should give people pause.' 7 It is a fact of life that
digitized personal data is continually collected, replicated, transmitted,
stored, and used.18 Any reasonable person should know this information is
also subject to misuse1 9
Of course, knowing does not mean condoning. It is understandable that
hacking-an intentional, malicious act-is a crime.20 Businesses should
make reasonable efforts to prevent the theft and misuse of customers' per-
sonal information that is collected and exchanged for business purposes. 21
Individuals who suffer actual injuries when their data is stolen and misused
should be compensated. However, the dollar value of an injury sustained due
to compromised names, addresses, credit and debit card numbers, social se-
curity numbers, and other "run-of-the-mill" personal information is usually
quite small-less than $99 for most.2 2
Based on the amount of actual injury, then, the usual, large-scale data
breach that results in the theft of consumers' personal information from re-
tailers and service providers does not justify a hysterical response.23 The rush
17. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shop
ping-habits.html?_r=0 (explaining that Target's well-known "pregnancy pre-
diction" data mining, which enabled the company to identify and market spe-
cifically to newly-pregnant women, created a stir about the use of very private
information for commercial purposes).
18. See id.
19. See Elise Hu, I Feel Nothing: The Home Depot Hack and Data Breach Fa-
tigue, NPR (Sept. 8, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechcon
sidered/2014/09/03/345539074/i-feel-nothing-the-home-depot-hack-and-data-
breach-fatigue ("You've certainly read the what-to-do-in-the-event-of-a-hack
stories here, and elsewhere. How many times have we recommended looking at
your credit card bills for any weird purchases, or had security experts remind us
to change our passwords, or use two-factor authentication, or not trust the cloud
with our most private images?").
20. See Stored Communications Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2709 (West
2012).
21. See discussion infra Part II.C..
22. Id.
23. Of course, not all data breaches are equal. If a foreign government or terrorist
group was responsible for or gains access to information from the background
checks of millions of U.S. government employees-including contacts with
foreign nationals and psychological evaluations, for example-from the breach
of the Office of Personnel Management, those employees may be at risk for
blackmail, and the foreign nationals for persecution in their home country. See,
e.g., Kim Zetttner & Andy Greenberg, Why the OPM Breach is Such a Privacy
and Security Nightmare, WIRED (Jun. 11, 2015, 10:40 PM), http://www.wired.
com/2015/06/opm-breach-security-privacy-debacle/ (discussing the signifi-
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to the courthouse is on, however. 24 Consumers have filed hundreds of data
security breach lawsuits that allege dozens of federal and state law claims.25
Roughly three-quarters of the lawsuits have been class actions.26
Consumers whose information has been exposed to security breaches
may suffer actual court-redressable injuries.
With the loss of security, consumers may suffer emotional distress
worrying about lost privacy and identity risks. They may spend
money and time to forestall these dangers by purchasing credit
monitoring services, monitoring credit and bank accounts, and
seeking to cancel current debit and credit cards. They also may
lose opportunities due to unavailable credit or a decline in their
credit ratings. 27
Filing a lawsuit, however, is not always a beneficial remedy. Private civil
lawsuits are arguably an inappropriate avenue for those seeking a remedy for
data security breaches. The fundamental goal should be preventing data
breaches altogether: spending time and resources remedying the theft of less
sensitive "commonplace" personal information may do little to advance this
goal and be inefficient and unnecessary.
Of course, not all data is equal. Health information in medical records,
for example, is considered particularly sensitive.28 But unlike the theft of
"commonplace" information, such as addresses and social security numbers,
the large-scale theft of hacked medical information does not seem to cause
wide-spread damage. Thus, while a thief could selectively hack a public fig-
ure's health record for the purpose of blackmail or embarrassment, the rea-
sons behind a wholesale hack of medical records-a seemingly remote
cance of an instance where hackers in China gained access to information about
U.S. workers with government security clearances).
24. Sasha Romanosky et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 74 (2014).
25. Id. at 100 (identifying 86 unique causes of action from the reported cases, the
authors identified 86 unique causes of action).
26. Id. at 83 (reporting that, since 2005, 76% of reported lawsuits for federal data
breach were filed as class actions).
27. Carolyn A. Deverich et al., Into the Breach: Plaintiffs Have Been Increasingly
Successful in Gaining Injunctive Relief for Online Security Breaches, 34 L.A.
LAW. 27, 28 (Feb. 2012) (noting that data breach plaintiffs may also seek equi-
table relief, such as requiring the defendant to provide plaintiff with the provi-
sion of credit monitoring services by the defendant).
28. See generally U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., HIPAA for Professionals,
HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaalfor-professionals/index.html (last visited
Jun. 2, 2016) (explaining that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act imposes enhanced security requirements on health care providers and
related entities).
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possibility-are only speculative.29 Class action lawsuits arising from the
breach of medical history data are not, therefore, clogging the courthouses.
Nor are the consequences of data breach all relatively minor. Consider
the following scenario:
[I]magine you are driving at 70 mph in your car when suddenly
the windshield wipers go on, the entertainment system clicks on
full blast, the horn is honking and the air conditioner starts blow-
ing arctic cold air. Then suddenly you feel the brakes engage. The
vehicle is coming to full stop with a freeway full of cars coming
up fast in your rearview mirror.30
As it turns out, the vehicle's control system was hacked.31 This may warrant
some hysteria.
Still, a theft of any data is still a theft, and without a doubt database
hacking should not and cannot just be ignored. And theoretically, the threat
of litigation by data breach victims32 should both deter hackers33 and incen-
tivize companies to employ appropriate security measures. 34 However, there
are many reasons why many businesses with client and consumer databases
at risk for hacking do not fit into this paradigm.35 Accordingly, private litiga-
29. See, e.g., Cristina Maze, OPM hack: What criminal hackers can do with your
personal data (Ideo), THE CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Jun. 5, 2015), http://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2015/0605/OPM-hack-What-criminal-hack
ers-can-do-with-your-personal-data-video (suggesting that a stolen medical re-
cord could lead to "misdiagnosed illnesses" and fraudulent medical bills).
30. Brenda Craig, First Car-Hacking Class Action Filed against Ford, GM, and




32. Erika Harrell, Victims of Identity Theft, 2014, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Sept.
27, 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=PBdetail&iid=5410 (reporting
that 17.6 million residents in the United States were identity theft victims).
33. See SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING
ACT OF 2015, S. REP. No. 114-32, at 3 (2015) ("Moreover, it is these same
companies who are the victims of malicious cyber activity, and their appropri-
ate efforts to protect themselves and other future victims from cyber threats
should not only be authorized but protected from unnecessary litigation.").
34. Taiwo A. Oriola, Bugs for Sale: Legal and Ethical Proprieties of the Market in
Software Vulnerabilities, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 451, 455
(2011) ("[P]rogramming mistakes are at the core of [data security]
vulnerabilities.").
35. See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litigation, Case No. 5:12-cv-03088-EJD,
309 F.R.D. 573, 587 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (supporting the proposition that proving
compliance with an ill-defined "industry standard" would merely be a "battle
of the experts," and lead to an uncertain outcome.).
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tion may not help. Instead, litigation may undermine the goal of deterrence,
do a poor job identifying "blameworthy" parties, and inadequately compen-
sate victims.36 Therefore, some commentators argue, state legislatures should
restrict an individual's private cause of action in tort, as well as statutory
rights providing a cause of action.37 In some cases, those commentators urge
providing liability immunity to some companies.38 Another alternative to a
private lawsuit is to create an administered compensation fund to compensate
victims of breaches.39
Part II of this article examines the phenomenon of data breach: how a
breach can occur, 40 the cost presented by a breach,41 and the prevention
mechanisms used.42 Part III includes a survey of data breach litigation and
explores how large-scale hacking-related data breaches differ from other
"wrongful corporate conduct," which is the usual justification for private,
civil litigation,43 and proposes, in broad strokes, how state law might be mod-
36. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Com-
pensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 648 (2003) ("[T]ort plaintiffs must prove
liability, bear the risk that the jury may find against them in the liability phase,
pay attorneys fees from any recovery (unless unusual circumstances permit fee-
shifting), and enforce the judgment.").
37. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 114-32, at 10 (explaining that private entities are en-
couraged by the unwillingness to permit a "cause of action . . . for the monitor-
ing of information systems").
38. See Alexander, supra note 36, at 670 ("[I]mmunity from judicial or administra-
tive review limits the chance that a quick response will be frustrated by second-
guessing or litigation over the determination.").
39. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make
Patients Safer: "Avoidable Classes of Events" Are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 478, 483 (2005) ("The best known non-tort compensation
method is an administrative compensation system that completely replaces
tort.").
40. WHITE HOUSE, LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE: DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION, at
§ I (g)(1), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/let
ters/data-breach-notification.pdf.
41. 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study, IBM X-FORCE RES., http://www-0l.ibm.com/
common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?infotype=SA&subtype=WH&htmlfid=SEW03053
WWEN (last visited Jun. 2, 2016).
42. 2015 Data Protection & Breach Readiness Guide, ONLINE TRUST ALLIANCE
(Feb. 13, 2015), https:/otalliance.org/system/files/files/resource/documents/
dpd_2015-guide.pdf (Examples include effective password management, least
privilege user access, hardening client devices, regular penetration tests and
vulnerability scans, continuous infrastructure monitoring, mobile device man-
agement, and others.).
43. See, e.g., Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examina-
tion of the Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms, 22 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 755, 756 (2008).
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ified to account for such differences. Part IV proposes a more radical change
to the current regime: the abolition or substantial reduction in corporate lia-
bility for data breach from hacking, and the creation of an administered com-
pensation fund for consumer victims.44
II. DATA SECURITY AND BREACH
The term "information security" comprises three interrelated compo-
nents: confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data.45 An "information
security breach" primarily involves the first two components and occurs
when sensitive personally identifiable information46 is accessed without
authorization.47
Over the last ten years, data breaches have been reported more fre-
quently,48 due in part to the proliferation and commercialization of Internet
technology.49 Additionally, the reporting increase may result from Informa-
tion Technology (IT) making the subsequent and enduring transformation to
market security measures to protect one's personal data as a service-like
commodity.50 In turn, both the resulting increase in interoperability and the
exchange of data across various systems 51 lead to more data breaches.52 This
article provides insight on how breaches occur 53 and explores the conse-
quences of those breaches.54 Additionally, this article details the costs associ-
44. See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 39, at 483 ("The best known non-tort
compensation method is an administrative compensation system that com-
pletely replaces tort.").
45. WHITE HOUSE, LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE: DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION, at
§ l(g)(1).
46. Id. at § (1)(h).
47. Id. at § (1)(g)(1).
48. Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005-Present, PRIVACY RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach.
49. Stephen S. Gilstrap, Shifting the Burden in Software Licensing Agreements,
121 YALE L.J. 1271, 1271 (2012) ("Whether consumers purchase clothing on-
line or swipe their Visa cards after dinner, personal information moves con-
stantly through the electronic channels of commerce.").
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1273 ("[A]s businesses acquire and transmit more consumer information,
the potential liabilities associated with a security breach increase.").
53. See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of
Software Security, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 283, 288 (2006) (discussing
the many different routes for attacking computers or networks).
54. See Beales & Muris, supra note 9, at 118 ("Those consequences may involve
physical harm, as when stalkers obtain information about their victims or child
predators seek information online.").
10 [Vol. XIX
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ated with preventing data breaches55 and technical reasons why preventive
efforts are sometimes unsuccessful.56
A. Breaches and Causes
The number and magnitude of data breaches have risen sharply over the
last decade,57 more than doubling between 2006 and 201258 and leveling
since.59 The Global State of Information Security Survey reports that the
compound annual growth rate of detected breaches increased by 66% be-
tween 2009 and 2015.60 This increase in the occurrence of breaches comes
with a higher number of compromised records-almost 900 million breached
records have been reported since 2005.61 However, these figures are approxi-
mations because many data breaches either go undetected62 or are intention-
ally unreported by the compromised entities.63
Although determining the frequency of reporting breaches in relation to
the total number of breaches is impossible, entities are likely to report
breaches more frequently as the rate of breach occurrence steadily rises, par-
ticularly where state law requires reporting.64 While the public may expect an
55. Gilstrap, supra note 49, at 1279 (citing Standards for the Protection of Personal
Information of Residents of the Commonwealth, 201 Mass. Code Regs. 17.00
(2011)).
56. Derek E. Bambauer, Schrodinger's Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791,
844 (2015) (explaining that using preventative software is difficult because the
software is complex and can become vulnerable).
57. Open Security Foundation, Data Loss Statistics, DATALossDB, http://
datalossdb.org/statistics (last visited Jun 2, 2016) (data begins from 2007).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Security Incidents Continue to Rise in Cost and Frequency While Budgets De-
crease, according to PwC, CIO and CSO's The Global State of Information
Security@ Survey 2015, Pwc, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2014/
global-state-of-information-security-survey-2015 .html (last visited Jun. 2,
2016).
61. See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005-Present, supra
note 48 (reflecting the number of compromised records, not the number of
individuals potentially affected).
62. See, e.g., Computer Raiders Hit Big Credit File, TEXTFILES.COM (Jun. 22,
1984), http://www.textfiles.com/news/trw.
63. See Kamala D. Harris, Att'y Gen., Data Breach Report 2012, CA DEP'T OF
JUST. I https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/2012data-breach_
rpt.pdf (last visited Jun. 2, 2016) ("The cost of breach notification, in hard
dollars and reputation damage, has tended to focus the attention of top manage-
ment and shareholders on data privacy and security practices.").
64. See id. at iii ("[The Office of the Attorney General] review[s] the information
submitted in order to gain an understanding of the types of breaches that are
2016] 11I
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occasional breach to occur, the actual prevalence may be shocking.65 In fact,
approximately one in five organizations will likely suffer from a material
data breach in the next two years.66
There is no "typical" breach-they vary by factors, including:
* the methods used to compromise the data67 or reasons for the
compromise;68
* the number of records compromised;69
* the type or nature of the data accessed;70 and
* the type of organization housing the data.71
But the following non-exhaustive list contains the most common causes of a
breach:
* intentional malicious activity or hacking;72
* accidental publication;73
* insider jobs;74
* lost or stolen computers or media;75 and
occurring, what vulnerabilities they may reveal, and what actions might be
taken to prevent or reduce the likelihood of future breaches.").
65. See Hu, supra note 19.
66. See 2015 Data Protection & Breach Readiness Guide, supra note 42, at 6.
67. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 53, at 288.
68. See id. at 298 ("The people behind these attacks can be anonymous criminals,
insiders intent on revenge, or amateur hackers using automated malware that
they could not create on their own.").
69. See, e.g., David McCandless et al., World's Biggest Data Breaches and Hacks,
INFO. is BEAUTIFUL, http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/wor
Ids-biggest-data-breaches-hacks (last updated May 6, 2016).
70. Data Breaches 101: How They Happen, What Gets Stolen, and Where It All
Goes, TREND MICRO (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/se
curity/news/cyber-attacks/data-breach- 101.
71. Id.
72. See Hu, supra note 19.
73. See, e.g., Alex Hern, Mozilla confirms leak of 76,000 developer email ad-
dresses, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technolo
gy/2014/aug/05/mozilla-leak-developer-email-addresses-passwords-firefox.
74. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 53, at 298 ("In addition to the highly
skilled malicious hackers who create malware tools, disgruntled insiders can
also pose a serious threat.").
75. See Harris, supra note 63, at 9 (17% of reported breaches occurred because of
lost or stolen hardware, and 6% occurred because of lost or stolen media).
12 [Vol. XIX
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* patently malfunctioning security measures. 76
Intentional hacking results in more stolen or compromised records than
all other categories combined.77 A larger data-theft hack might compromise
tens of millions of records.78 For instance, recent hacking incidents compro-
mised the confidential account and financial information of:
* 145 million eBay records;
* 130 million Heartland records;
* 76 million JPMorgan Chase client records;
* 80 million Anthem records;
* 77 million Sony records;
* 70 million Target records; and
* 56 million Home Depot records.79
The underlying cause of these breaches is likely a defect in software
security system coding.80 An indirect cause, on the other hand, could be
human error (e.g., failing to detect a software defect during a security audit,81
or improperly installing or monitoring a security system). 82 Regardless of the
cause, a "vulnerability" means that "no one . . . is immune to cyber
attacks."83
76. See Oriola, supra note 34, at 463 ("A faulty code or bug is the Achilles' heel of
computer or network systems security, and one of the weakest links through
which networked computers are traditionally breached.").
77. See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005-Present, supra
note 48 (reflecting that more than 70% of record breaches were due to hacking
or "unknown").
78. See, e.g., McCandless et al., supra note 69.
79. Id.; Aarti Shahani, 3 Charged In Hacking Case Against JPMorgan Chase, 11
Other Firms, NPR (Nov. 11, 2015, 5:07 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/11/
455577683/3-charged-in-hacking-case-against-jpmorgan-chase- 11-other-firms.
80. See Oriola, supra note 34, at 463 ("A faulty code or bug is the Achilles' heel of
computer or network systems security, and one of the weakest links through
which networked computers are traditionally breached.").
81. See, e.g., John Pletz, Chicago's Trustwave sued over Target data breach,
CRAIN'S CHI. Bus. ONLINE (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/
article/20140325/BLOGS 11/140329865/chicagos-trustwave-sued-over-target-
data-breach.
82. See Thor Olavsrud, Most Data Breaches Caused by Human Error, System
Glitches, CIO (Jun. 17, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.cio.com/article/2384855/
compliance/most-data-breaches-caused-by-human-error-system-glitches.ht
ml.
83. See Oriola, supra note 34, at 458, 460 (presenting a discussion of "recent high
profile vulnerabilities exploits by malicious hackers within the context of recur-
ring software vulnerabilities imbroglio dictated by the inherent and underlying
flaws in software codes").
2016]1 13
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Securing against accidental publications (those caused by human error)
may be even more difficult than preventing attacking due to software vulner-
abilities, due to the fact-specific situations surrounding such breaches. For
example, the Australian Immigration Department accidentally disclosed per-
sonal details of the world leaders attending the G20 summit in 2015, includ-
ing passport numbers, visa numbers, etc.8 4 The Australian Privacy
Commissioner's Office explained that an employee most likely caused the
breach when he mistakenly sent an email containing the sensitive informa-
tion to the local organizing committee of the Asian Cup.85
Similar to an accidental publication, reasons vary widely for a hacking
occurrence called an "inside attack." An inside attack occurred in 2014 when
a company consultant for the Korea Credit Bureau stole and leaked personal
credit ratings of at least 20 million of the Bureau's customers, 86 for example.
A German Vodafone employee stole approximately two million customer
records in 2013.87 German law enforcement agencies identified and seized
the assets from the attacker soon after.88 Vodafone immediately notified its
customers about the breach and cautioned against responding to requests for
personal information.89
The frequency of incidents related to stolen computers or media (tablets
and smartphones, for example) has decreased in recent years, perhaps due to
the increased effectiveness of security training efforts.90 These devices may
also be lower-valued targets for theft because of recent advancements in
cloud computing and virtualization that allow for the mobility of large
amounts of corporate data from employees' devices to a centrally managed
84. Paul Farrell, Personal details of world leaders accidentally revealed by G20




86. AFP, 20 Million People Fall Victim to South Korea Data Leak, SECURITY WK.
(Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.securityweek.com/20-million-people-fall-victim-
south-korea-data-leak.
87. Mike Lennon, Insider Steals Data of 2 Million Vodafone Germany Customers,




90. See generally Cyber Security Planning Guide, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://transition.fcc.gov/cyber/cyberplanner.pdf (last visited Jun. 2, 2016)
(providing "a tool for small businesses to create customized cyber security
planning guides.").
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infrastructure.91 Breaches related to stolen media or devices are insignificant
in terms of volume of data, rarely exceeding a million records, with the ma-
jority of reported breaches in the past five years arising from healthcare enti-
ties, such as Walgreens, Advanced Medical Group, Sutter Medical
Foundations, and Tricare.92
Some breaches are caused simply by an obvious mistake. For example,
a plain error led to the exposure of personal information of 150,000 Citi
customers when Citi failed to remove this information, collected between
2007 and 2011, from legal documents before filing those documents elec-
tronically on the PACER system. 9 3 Similarly, in 2014, the Mozilla Founda-
tion exposed about 76,000 Mozilla Developer Network users' email
addresses by running a failing data sanitization process for over thirty days.94
Even when a specific failure in security measures is not identified as the
cause of the breach, under certain circumstances it can reasonably be as-
sumed as the cause. In May of 2015, for example, unidentified criminals
downloaded the tax forms of 104,000 taxpayers from the website of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS), using the "Get Transcript" service offered by the
IRS on its website.95
As noted above, hacking accounts for the compromise of the most
records and an estimated 70% of all breaches.96 Hacking is no longer a lei-
sure activity undertaken by a small group of computer hobbyists; it has be-
come a lucrative business carried out by advanced, well-trained
cybercriminals with malicious intent to exploit data for potentially enormous
financial gain. For example, the three hackers charged with, inter alia, com-
mitting securities fraud on individuals whose identities were stolen from
JPMorgan allegedly made hundreds of millions of dollars.97 Personal infor-
mation about individuals, such as names, addresses, and social security num-
91. See Securing the Cloud for the Enterprise, SYMANTEC & VMWARE 13 (2011),
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/downloads/21187913_GAWPSecuring
theCloudfortheEnterprise_05%2011 .pdf.
92. See McCandless et al., supra note 69.
93. Eduard Kovacs, Citi Exposes Details of 150,000 Individuals Who Went into
Bankruptcy, SOFTPEDIA (July 22, 2013, 8:16 PM), http://news.softpedia.coml
news/Citi-Exposes-Details-of- 150-000-Individuals-Who-Went-into-Bankrupt
cy-369979.shtml.
94. See Hem, supra note 73.
95. Jose Pagliery, Criminals use IRS website to steal data on 104,000 people, CNN
MONEY (May 26, 2015, 6:05 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/26/pf/taxes/
irs-website-data-hack/.
96. See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005-Present, supra
note 48 (reporting that over 70% of record breaches were due to hacking or
"unknown").
97. Shahani, supra note 79.
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bers, sells for $3 on the black market.98 The price of financial information,
like credit card numbers, as well as PayPal or eBay account credentials,
ranges from $10 to $300 per record.99
Why any particular company, among the millions of candidates, is se-
lected for hacking is largely unknown.o0 It could well be because that com-
pany has porous security measures. 01 In the security industry, it is commonly
presumed that hackers engage in "persistent advanced surveillance": sophis-
ticated hackers roam the networks searching for vulnerabilities and attack
when one is encountered.102 It is also possible that hackers simply target a
particular business because someone is paying for the service-possibly a
competitor-or for political purposes: the 2010 Symantec Corporation's
global survey showed that half of critical information infrastructure providers
experienced politically motivated cyber attacks in 2010.103 North Korean
hackers intentionally hacked Sony, it was widely-rumored, if not proven, be-
cause of the pending release by Sony of a comedy show about the assassina-
tion of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Un.104
B. Consequences of Breach
i. Cost to consumers
While a business can estimate and report the overall number of records
breached, hackers do not report the percentage of those records they actually
misused; available data is scanty. A national survey on identity theft con-
98. Follow the Data: Dissecting Data Breaches and Debunking the Myths, TREND
MICRO (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/
cyber-attacks/follow-the-data ("There's actually a big surplus of [personal in-
formation about individuals] currently available in the cybercriminal under-
ground. This has caused its price to drop significantly, from US $4 [in 2014] to
US $1 [in 2015].").
99. Id.
100. Shahani, supra note 79 (suggesting the hackers sought out records of persons
who were likely to buy and sell stock).
101. Oriola, supra note 34, at 455 (noting that "software vulnerabilities reputedly
account for most of the reported computer or network security problems").
102. Id. at 478 ("[D]etection research is technically known as software penetration
testing, a security and quality assurance testing designed to break into a net-
work to demonstrate that it could be done.").
103. See Symantec 2010 Critical Infrastructure Protection Study: Global Results,
SYMANTEC 5 (Oct. 2010), http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/press-
kits/Symantec_2010_CIPStudyGlobalData.pdf (reporting that "half (53 per-
cent) of all firms said they suspected or were pretty sure they had experienced
an attack waged with a specific political goal in mind").
104. Ari Shapiro, Sony CEO Reflects on Immobilizing Cyberattack 1 Year Later,
NPR (Nov. 20, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/20/456831542/
sony-ceo-reflects-on-immobilizing-cyber-attack- 1-year-later.
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ducted annually by Javelin Strategy & Research indicates that, in 2012,
22.5% of data breach victims also became a victim of identity theft.105 Other
research concludes that only a few compromised persons actually suffer any
adverse consequence. 106
A "back of the envelope" calculation supports the latter proposition. In
2014, a combined 357 million records were compromised due to reported
breaches of eBay (145 million), Anthem (80 million), Home Depot (56 mil-
lion) and JP Morgan (76 million).107 Harm from these breaches could, of
course, result in a later year. But on the assumption that the thief will work
sooner rather than later-before the breach is discovered, before customers
are notified of the breach, before credit cards are cancelled-it seems reason-
able to assume that more actual harm would be caused at or around the time
of the breach.os In 2014, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 17.6
million people experienced an actual financial loss due to a data breach.109
Given these figures and these assumptions-admittedly rough-less than 5%
of the records hacked were used for any nefarious purpose or at least none
that was detected within a reasonable period of time after the breach. In other
words, the hackers steal much more data than they use. 10
Direct financial loss from the theft can be defined as the "amount the
offender obtained from misusing the victim's account or personal informa-
tion, including the estimated amount of goods, services, or cash obtained."111
Indirect financial loss includes lost time and money, correcting account infor-
mation, and all additional costs necessary to remediate the misuse of personal
information.112 The other major category of damage claimed by victims is
105. Al Pascual, 2013 Identity Fraud Report: Data Breaches Becoming a Treasure
Trove for Fraudsters, JAVELIN STRATEGY & RES. (Feb. 20, 2013), https:/
www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2013-identity-fraud-report-data-brea
ches-becoming-treasure-trove-fraudsters.
106. See Lilia Rode, Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing
the Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data Security?, 43 Hous. L.
REV. 1597, 1627 (2007).
107. See McCandless et al., supra note 69.
108. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, REPORT TO CONGRES-
SIONAL REQUESTERS: PERSONAL INFORMATION 29 (2007).
109. Compare Harrell, supra note 32 (reporting that 17.6 million residents in the
U.S. were victims of identity theft), with Javelin Strategy Research, $16 Billion
Stolen from 12.7 Million Identity Fraud Victims in 2014, According to Javelin
Strategy & Research, JAVELIN STRATEGY & RES. (Mar. 3, 2015), https://
www.javelinstrategy.com/press-release/16-billion-stolen-127-million-identity-
fraud-victims-2014-according-javelin-strategy (reporting that 12.7 million U.S.
citizens were subject to financial loss).
I 10. See Hu, supra note 19.
111. Harrell, supra note 32, at 6.
112. Id.
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future loss: various costs allegedly arising from an increased risk of, or sus-
ceptibility to, data compromise, future data compromise, or identity theft,
including the cost of subscribing to credit monitoring services.113 Victims
also claim damages resulting from the alleged loss of value associated with a
wide array of goods and services purchased by the victim from the breached
entity. For example, the victim may recover the value of goods bought from
Neiman Marcusil 4 or the cost of an insurance premium.i5
For those consumers adversely affected by a breach, the out-of-pocket
expense is ordinarily quite small. Given the millions of victims of identity
fraud, the overall figures are rather startling: one report found $ 13.3 billion
in losses to consumers between 2005 and 2011,116 and another report re-
corded $13.1 billion in 2013 alone., 17For any one individual, however, the
loss is, on average, modest. According to the 2006 Federal Trade Commis-
sion Identity Theft Survey Report, the median out-of-pocket consumer ex-
pense arising from all identity theft was $0.118 The median number of hours
spent resolving the problem was four.119 In 2014, according to the United
States Bureau of Justice Statistics, one-third of those who had experienced
identity theft in that year incurred no identifiable loss, and of the two-thirds
who did, one-half incurred an out-of-pocket loss of less than $99.120 The
113. E.g., the courts' discussions regarding the allegations of future harm have pri-
marily been centered on whether those allegations give rise to standing.
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015); see also
Green v. EBay, Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047 (E.D. La.
May 4, 2015); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2014). Whether and to what extent
future harm is a compensable element of damage for any particular cause of
action asserted in a lawsuit arising from data breach is a topic beyond the scope
of this article. For a discussion regarding the validity of such harm, see gener-
ally Rachel Yoo, An Expected Harm Approach to Compensating Consumers
for Unauthorized Information Disclosures, 19 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 4 (2012).
114. The plaintiffs claimed they would not have purchased the goods had they
known their data was at risk. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692.
115. E.g., Resnick v. Avmed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2012).
116. Lynn Langton, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, IDEN-
TITY THEFT REPORTED BY HOUSEHOLDS, 2005-2010 (2011), http://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/itrh05 I 0.pdf.
117. Pascual, 2013 Identity Fraud Report, supra note 105, at 2 (reporting that the
number declined in 2014, to $12.7 million).





120. Harrell, supra note 32.
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California Data Breach Report of 2014 reports somewhat higher numbers:
the average cost to a consumer who fell victim to the fraudulent use of a
credit card was $63, debit card $170, checking account $222, and Social
Security number $289.121
This minimal economic loss may be explained, in part, by the existence
of numerous laws that limit a consumer's liability for certain fraud-related
losses122 and those laws that require prompt reporting of data breaches.123
Credit card companies pay for the cost of replacing cards,124 and companies
undertake other voluntary efforts to reduce customer loss, such as providing
credit monitoring services.125 Not all consumers escape so lightly, however.
According to the 2006 Federal Trade Commission Survey, for example, 5%
of consumers incur up to $5,000 in out-of-pocket expenses and may spend
1200 hours resolving the problem.1 26 The 2014 Bureau of Justice Statistics
report concluded that 14% of those victims who sustained a financial loss
incurred out-of-pocket expenses of $1,000 or more. And while the total loss
to any one individual is insignificant relative to the scale of the fraud in its
entirety, it is important to note that these losses can be devastating on an
individual level; a $500 unreimbursed credit card charge can be catastrophic
to a single mother working a minimum-wage job to support three children.127
ii. Cost to the breached entity
On the other side of the equation is the cost to the breached entity. The
costs incurred by breached entities generally fall into two categories. The
first category of cost is "remediation" of the breach. The company's
databases, network, and equipment may have been damaged in the breach
and require repair, leading to a temporary disruption of basic business func-
121. Kamala D. Harris, CAL. DEP'T OF JUST., CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT
OCT. 2014, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/2014data-
breach-rpt.pdf. Earlier reports pegged the numbers higher. For example: a
Javelin survey from 2004 reported a mean cost per victim ranging from $5,686
to $12,646. Whether the actual loss is diminishing, due to the increased effec-
tiveness of, inter alia, post-breach remedial measures or the differences lie in
the techniques of the studies themselves is unknown.
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1) (1980) (placing a $50 limit on the amount of con-
sumer liability for any unauthorized use of a payment card).
123. E.g., Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act,
Pub. L. 111-5, tit. XIII, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
124. E.g., Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 164 (1st Cir. 2011) (dis-
cussing validity of mitigation costs and noting that many customers had had
their credit cards replaced by the issuing bank).
125. E.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015).
126. Federal Trade Commission: 2006 Identity Theft Survey Report, supra note 118.
127. See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETrING
BY IN AMERICA (2010).
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tions. The Sony hackers "burned down the house," according to the com-
pany's CEO: after stealing the data, they wiped the databases and destroyed
most of the company's servers and PCs.128 In addition to internal "clean-up"
and repair expenses, these remediation costs include expenses incurred noti-
fying victims of the breach and replacing their cards. In addition to these
direct costs, the entity also typically incurs indirect costs: counter-party and
customer business relation expenses, customer chum, and customer loss. Es-
timates of the overall cost to the breached company vary widely. One widely-
cited report shows that the average cost to the company for each stolen re-
cord containing sensitive and confidential information is $217 ($154 glob-
ally), and the average cost per breach is $6.5 million.129 Another study, based
on insurance claims data, reports an "average" of 58 cents per record lost,
noting that the cost per record declines as the number of records breached
increases. 130
The second major category of post-breach costs includes fines, penal-
ties, compensatory awards, and attorneys' fees arising from enforcement ac-
tion and other litigation. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, may
exact civil penalties and consumer redress payments and also may require the
implementation of security programs and audits in a successful enforcement
action.131 For example, ChoicePoint, Inc. paid $10 million in civil penalties
and $5 million in consumer redress to settle the FTC's charges in 2006.132 In
2015, the FTC announced that AT&T had agreed to pay $25 million in con-
nection with an investigation of breaches of several call centers housing the
personal data of U.S. consumers.1 33 Litigation expenses-excluding reported
settlement figures-are almost impossible to quantify because companies do
not typically report these numbers separately from other costs. By way of
example, Target reported $252 in cumulative expenses post-breach, includ-
ing litigation and expected liability costs.1 34 In any event, although cost esti-
128. Shapiro, supra note 104.
129. 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis, PONEMON INST. (2015),
http://www-0 I.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?info
type=SA&subtype=WH&htmlfid=SEWO3053WWEN.
130. Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report, at 28
(2015), https://msisac.cisecurity.org/whitepaper/documents/I .pdf.
131. FTC enforcement actions involve alleged violations of the agency's financial
privacy and safeguards rules, or unfair or deceptive practices. See generally
F.T.C. v. Wyndham, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
132. Hughes, supra note 9, at 124.
133. AT&T to Pay $25 Million to Settle Consumer Privacy Investigation, FED.
COMM. COMMIssioN (2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/att-pay-25m-settle
-investigation-three-data-breaches-0.
134. Target's $10M Settlement in Data Breach Lawsuit is a Tiny Price to Pay, ARS
TECHNICA (2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/targets-I Om-set
tlement-in-data-breach-lawsuit-is-a-tiny-price-to-pay/.
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mates vary, it is universally agreed that the affected businesses suffer-by
far-the larger share of the cost of breach, compared to affected consumers,
and perhaps as much as 90% of the total loss.iss
C. Preventing Breach
Many critics believe companies are simply not doing enough to prevent
data breaches. By one estimate, 90% of the data breaches that occurred in
2014 could have been avoided had the compromised organizations simply
followed the "best security practices" in the industry.136 But the complete
picture is perhaps more nuanced.
The dramatic increase in data breach is occurring despite the fact that
the amount spent protecting and securing this data has increased consistently
over the years. Continuing the trend, over the next five years, such spending
is expected to grow at approximately 2.5% annually,137 and spending on IT
security alone is expected to grow by 8.2%.138 Worldwide spending on infor-
mation security is expected to be near $75 billion in 2015139 and is projected
to grow to $101 billion by 2018.140
Perhaps companies should just be spending more to protect consumer
data. But money alone will not fix the problem. Data security systems are
complex beasts, with multiple vulnerabilities and points of attack.141 And the
hackers are only getting better: the complexity and effectiveness of security
attacks has been increasing over the years.1 42 Despite significant advances,
135. Raymond G. Mullady, Jr. & Scott D. Hansen, Identity Theft Litigation: A
Roadmap for Defense and Protection, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 563, 564 (2008).
136. 2014 Data Protection & Breach Readiness Guide, ONLINE TRUST ALLIANCE,
https://otalliance.org/resources/2014-data-protection-breach-readiness-guide-
overview (last updated Apr. 7, 2014) (these practices, for example, would in-
clude effective password management, least privilege user access, hardening
client devices, regular penetration tests and vulnerability scans, continuous in-
frastructure monitoring, mobile device management, etc.).
137. Gartner Worldwide IT Spending Forecast, GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/
technology/research/it-spending-forecast/ (last visited Jun. 2, 2016).
138. Ericka Chickowski, 2015 Security Spending By The Numbers, BITDEFENDER
(Jan. 12, 2015), http://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/20 15-security-spending
-by-the-numbers.
139. Gartner Says Worldwide Information Security Spending Will Grow Almost 4.7
Percent to Reach $75.4 Billion in 2015, GARTNER (Sept. 23, 2015), http://
www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3135617 (note that the report does not isolate
spending by U.S. companies only).
140. Steve Morgan, Cybersecurity Market Report, CYBERSECURITY VENTURES,
http://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-market-report/ (last visited Jun.
2, 2016).
141. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 53, at 296-97.
142. Id. at 296.
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information security solutions are still primarily reactive rather than proac-
tive in nature. The inevitable consequence of this fact is that a number of data
breaches will continue to occur regardless of the amount spent on security.143
Moreover, a business can make substantial investments in security tech-
nologies without a significant return because the effective implementation of
those technologies is heavily dependent on the availability of specialists in
the workforce. As the number and types of security threats grow at a close to
exponential rate, it should come as no surprise that there is currently a
shortage of qualified cybersecurity professionals on the job market.144 Indus-
try experts estimate that the demand for information specialists will soon
reach 6 million globally, with an expected shortfall of 1.5 million persons. 145
This gap is even larger for top-level cybersecurity experts, or those who de-
sign and manage the deployment of information security initiatives in large
organizations. 146 If the supply-demand gap were closed, however, the indus-
try would still suffer from the lack of clarity and standardization in data se-
curity standards.147 Colleges and universities struggle to create cyber security
programs that meet industry needs without a clear and consistent definition
of what those needs are. 148
Given the constraints and the unknowns, it could perhaps be concluded
that in regards to preventing data breaches from hacking-as opposed to ob-
vious mistakes and internal errors-a company should be expected to meet
any specific standards set forth by its industry,149 remain abreast of develop-
ments in technology and knowledgeable about the latest in hacking tech-
niques, and strive for continuous improvement. That a company should have
met any one security expert's opinion as to what security measures are "rea-
143. Bambauer, supra note 56, at 844 ("Complete prevention of inaccuracy is im-
possible . . . [s]oftware code displays extraordinary complexity, leading invari-
ably to bugs. Hackers are adept at finding and exploiting vulnerabilities.").
144. See Steve Morgan, Cybersecurity's Labor Epidemic, FORBES TECH. (Sept. 21,
2015, 2:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2015/09/21/%E2%
80%8Bcybersecuritys-labor-epidemic/#6cd50e90leda.
145. Steve Morgan, Cybersecurity Job Market To Suffer Severe Workforce
Shortage, CSO ONLINE (July 28, 2015, 5:32 AM), http://www.csoonline.con
article/2953258/it-careers/cybersecurity-job-market-figures-2015-to-2019-indi
cate-severe-workforce-shortage .html.
146. . See Morgan, Cybersecurity's Labor Epidemic, supra note 144.




149. See, e.g., Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,
NAT'L INST. OF SCI. AND TECH. (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.nist.gov/cyber
framework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf (noting this
would be a general example of an appropriate security standard).
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sonable," expressed in the context of a negligence lawsuit or otherwise, may
just not be a reasonable or feasible expectation.150 And whether it is 10% or a
significantly higher figure, a number of data breaches simply could not have
been avoided even by employing the "best practices" of information security.
A final point on spending for security measures should be noted. The
increased spending on security measures may not yet be stemming the tide of
breaches, but it does decrease the costs to companies once a breach occurs. In
addition to employing technical countermeasures like encryption, post-
breach costs can be minimized by having IT security functions strongly al-
igned with business operations (top management involvement, well-defined
business continuity, disaster recovery procedures, employee awareness and
training, etc.). For example, a well-trained incident response team may on
average reduce the cost of responding to a data breach by almost $24 per
record.151 Proper technology countermeasures and business continuity plan-
ning demonstrably reduce the cost of responding to a breach.152
D. In Sum
For the most part, data security breaches are caused by criminal activity
over which the breached entity has absolutely no control. A company may
become the target of an attempted breach because it has failed to employ
reasonably acceptable security measures, has done or said something "un-
popular," or simply by random chance. Protecting confidential consumer data
against breach is a steep and growing cost to businesses, and it is difficult, if
not impossible, to determine how much is enough. The breached entity bears
far the lion's share of the cost of a successful breach: the consumer, not so
much.
III. THE LITIGATION LANDSCAPE
This section, in broad strokes, describes the world of private litigation
on behalf of consumers affected by a data breach. It then discusses why pri-
vate litigation is an inapposite solution given the "how and why" of data
150. Proving whether or not the breached company had met some ill-defined "indus-
try standard" would be just a "battle of the experts," the outcome of which
would be uncertain. In re Linkedln User Privacy Litigation, Case No. 5:12-cv-
03088-EJD, 309 F.R.D. 573, 587 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing the strengths
and weakness of the plaintiffs' case in evaluating proposed settlement
agreement).
151. 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, PONEMON INST. (May 2015),
http://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sew0355usen/SEWO3055
USEN.PDF.
152. See 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Impact of Business Continuity Manage-
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breaches and proposes minor, but possibly significant changes to common
law remedies for data breach.
A. The Data Breach Lawsuit
According to one study, between 2005 and 2010, there were sixty-five
data breach lawsuits in U.S. federal courts where plaintiffs alleged a compro-
mise of their personal information.153 76% of these lawsuits were class ac-
tions.154 A search of reported decisions from 2011 through 2015, using the
same search terms as used in that study, returns at least sixteen such cases in
federal courts.155 It seems fair to assume, particularly during the initial stages
of a lawsuit, that the number of reported decisions would be a small subset of
the number of cases in suit. Given the increases in the number of reported
breaches over the last few years, and keeping in mind that not all data
breaches can be prevented, regardless of the security measures enacted,156 it
can safely be concluded that these cases will continue to plague the judicial
system. "Plague" seems a fair word to use, since these cases are typically
mammoth undertakings involving complex legal and factual issues. As one
court presiding over a data breach lawsuit stated, "as evident from the instant
action, this climate undoubtedly raises a variety of thorny legal issues that
Congress and the courts will continue to grapple with for the foreseeable
future." 157
By way of example only, In re Target1s8 arose from a massive data
breach in which computer hackers gained access to credit and debit card
information, and other personal information for approximately 110 million
customers. 159 Lawsuits were filed by the consumers whose data was swiped
and by credit and debit card issuing companies, claiming damages for costs
153. Romanosky et al., supra note 24, at 84 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged a
breach of "their" personal information, suggesting that most, if not all of these
lawsuits were brought by individual consumers, not by competitors alleging
theft of trade secrets, insurance companies, or other putative plaintiffs.).
154. Id. at 83.
155. The LEXIS database was used for this search (emphasis added).
156. See discussion infra Part II.D (noting most breaches are out of the control of
the company).
157. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 610 (D.N.J. 2014).
One of those complex issues is legal standing-which of the various injuries
claimed by data breach victims demonstrates standing to sue-as to which the
Supreme Court should soon shed some clarity in its forthcoming decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339, cert. granted 135 S.Ct. 1892 (2015).
158. In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn.
2014).
159. Id. at 1157.
24 [Vol. XIX
Your Personal Data Is at Risk
of replacing cards and reimbursing fraudulent charges.160 The complaint in
the consumer plaintiff class raised claims under the consumer protection laws
of forty-nine states and the District of Columbia; these laws differed in terms
of, inter alia, whether a private right of action was created, what kind of
injury justified redress, and whether the claim could be brought as a class.161
The complaint contended that Target violated data breach notification stat-
utes in thirty-eight jurisdictions162 and asserted various other state law claims,
the elements of which varied considerably from state to state.163 The Target
case is not unusual in the complexity of the claims. Data breach complaints,
in general, "allege a staggering range of both common-law (tort, breach of
contract) and statutory causes of action."164 This reported range includes
eighty-six unique causes of action.165 For example, the consumer plaintiff
class in the Sony breach litigation brought fifty-one independent causes of
action.166
This complexity arises, in part, because the defendant in a federal data
breach lawsuit has a national presence and therefore customers or clients in
many states. 167 But even "run-of-the-mill" lawsuits filed in state courts in-
volve multiple and overlapping claims. Thus, in Stanturf v. Amerigroup,168 a
plaintiff class composed of an alleged 400,000 Kansas residents sued a group
of insurance companies for data breach, raising ten claims based on state
law. 169
160. Id.; see generally In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 309
F.R.D. 482, 484 (D. Minn. 2015).
161. In re Target, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1161.
162. Id. at 1166.
163. Id. at 1171. The court noted, however, that the elements of the breach of con-
tract and unjust enrichment claims were substantially similar in the various
applicable jurisdictions.
164. Romanosky et al., supra note 24, at 76; see generally Caroline C. Cease, Giv-
ing Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data Breach Litigation,
66 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2014).
165. Romanosky et al., supra note 24, at 76.
166. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 956 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
167. This phenomenon is not limited to data breach cases, of course. In arguing that
state law claims for deceptive advertising should be preempted by federal law,
the author noted: "In this day and age, most advertising is nationwide and most
harm suffered is thus also nationwide." Stacey M. Lantagne, A Matter of Na-
tional Importance: The Persistent Inefficiency of Deceptive Advertising Class
Actions, 8 J. Bus. & TECH. L.J. 117, 118 (2012).
168. Class Action Petition, Stanturf v. Amerigroup, Case No. 2015-CV-000125
(Dist. Ct. of Douglas Cnty., Kan. Apr. 2, 2015).
169. Plaintiffs cobble together various state law claims because there is no federal or
state statute specifically creating a claim arising from breach of a consumer's
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The composition of the parties is also likely to be complex for several
reasons. First, the consumer plaintiff class is likely to be large. Certainly a
class of 400,000 putative consumer members is not unmanageable, and the
class can of course be much smaller.170 But the larger the class, the larger the
overall award will be in event of settlement or verdict.'7' Empirically, the
larger the data breach-and thus the larger the potential class-the greater
the probability that the case will be litigated.172 In other words, it is more
likely that the consumer plaintiff class will be large because smaller putative
classes will simply not end up in court.
Second, damage caused by a significant data breach can spread beyond
the individuals whose personal data has been compromised. A class of credit
card issuers sued Target as a consequence of that breach, as did Target share-
holders.173 Liability may extend far beyond the entity suffering the breach,
and the number of and relationship among putative defendants may create
another complication in the suit. Target's security software auditor was sued
alongside Target following that breach.174 The breach of an estimated 80 mil-
lion Anthem health care records could ensnare nearly sixty health insurance
plans from all over the United States.15 These entities have contractual rela-
digitized personal information. As discussed in more detail below, various fed-
eral statutes, including HIPAA, impose data security requirements without pro-
viding for a private cause of action for damage resulting from a data breach.
Similarly, state consumer protection statutes may or may not provide for a pri-
vate cause of action, and because these statutes were not enacted to address
data breach, whether and to what extent these provide consumer redress are
ongoing issues of interpretation.
170. For example, the complaint filed in Cole v. Gene-by-Gene, alleging improper
use of confidential information by the defendant, claimed a class of
"thousands." Complaint at 10, Cole v. Gene-by-Gene, dba Family Tree DNA,
Case No. 1:14-CV-00004-SLG (D. Alaska May 13, 2014).
171. Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging
Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1241 ("As a
general matter, the larger the company sued (as measured by market capitaliza-
tion), the larger the losses suffered by the putative class, and the larger the
potential settlement fund.").
172. Romanosky et al., supra note 24, at 83.
173. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 309 F.R.D. 482, 485 (D.
Minn. 2015).; see also Lone Star National Bank et al. v. Heartland Payment
Systems, Inc., No. 12-20648, 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing grant of
motion to dismiss negligence claims filed by issuing banks); In re TJX Co.
Retail Sec. Breach Litig.Company, 524 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass 2007) (Con-
sumer Track and Financial Institutions Track in this consolidated litigation).
174. Pletz, supra note 81.
175. Joseph Conn, Legal liabilities in recent data breach extend far beyond Anthem,
MOD. MED. ONLINE, Feb. 23, 2015, http://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/
20150223/NEWS/302239977.
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tionships with Anthem to facilitate a national payment network, and these
relationships may result in an extension of liability for the data breach.176
Businesses and their data are increasingly interconnected in the global econ-
omy, posing the risk that a data breach of one will implicate many.
At the end of the day, the case may well be settled. The settlement rate
for federally-litigated lawsuits appears to be about 50%.177 From the handful
of publicly available reports on how these settlements are disbursed, claim-
ants receive modest amounts, commensurate with what studies demonstrate
would have been their actual losses.178 Also, because of the negligible mone-
tary loss, it seems likely that only few within a class actually submit claims.
In the LinkedIn data breach litigation, the settlement netted $14.81 for each
of the roughly 6% of the class making a claim.179 In the Heartland case,180
290 claims were submitted from a class of over 100 million and only eleven
were deemed valid.181 Only $175 was paid per claimant for a total payout to
consumers of about $2,000.182 According to an empirical study of settlement
payouts for data breach cases litigated in federal courts between 2005 and
2011, the mean value of settlements awarded to plaintiffs was about $2,500
per plaintiff, with most awards being a nominal amount of approximately
$500 and often awarded to named plaintiffs only.183
B. A Data Breach Lawsuit?
The picture painted thus far probably appears little different from the
"standard" consumer class action. Class actions are by nature large, expen-
sive, and messy affairs often launched against entire industries.184 In so-
176. Id.
177. Romanosky et al., supra note 24, at 84.
178. Deverich et al., supra note 27, at 5.
179. In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litigation, Case No. 5:12-cv-03088-EJD, 309
F.R.D. 573, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
180. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F.
Supp. 2d 1040 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
181. Id. at 1050.
182. Eric Goldman, Data Security Breach Settlement Class of 130M Individuals Has
II Claimant (at a Cost of 160k Per) In re Heartland Payment Systems, TECH.
& MARKETING L. BLOG, Apr. 3, 2012, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/
2012/04/data_securityb.htm.
183. Romanosky et al., supra note 24, at 100. It should be noted that unclaimed
funds would be spent as per the terms of the settlement agreement, on pay-
ments to non-profit organizations, for example. See generally Christine P. Bar-
tholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3241 (2015).
184. E.g., Eric A. Poster, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 CHI. L. REV. 1141
(2003) (reviewing W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKE-FILLED Rooms: A POSTMORTEM ON
THE TOBACCO DEAL (2002)).
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called "small stake claims,"185 or when individual damages are low, it neces-
sarily follows that each member of the class will receive a modest or token
amount for compensation.18 6 Generally, after a settlement, the number of ac-
tual claims made by the class is small.187 In fact, "[s]ome class members
never learn of the settlement or forego filing claims. Even with directly
mailed settlement checks, some are returned or never cashed."SS
Despite the large, overall cost and the potentially small payout to indi-
vidual plaintiffs, the class action theoretically benefits society. Much has
been written about those potential benefits,189 and it would be impossible to
address all the arguments made about the positive effects of this procedural
vehicle. Aggregating a number of small claims creates a potential pay-off
sizeable enough to encourage attorneys to prosecute these cases.1 90 Thus, as a
class, injured parties can serve as "private attorney generals,"l91 enforcing
laws that are otherwise flouted. And in prosecuting the case, plaintiffs' attor-
neys may discover corporate wrongdoing that would otherwise go unde-
tected.192 Regarding small stake claims, class actions are justified because
they "level the playing field" and allow individuals "to seek redress for
185. Bartholomew, supra note 183, at 3248.
186. E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff,
60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs.167, 168 (1997) (discussing cases in which class
members receive almost nothing); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen,
Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (1996); David W.
Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual
Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1685, 1689 (2005) (describing how, in a typical infringement action
brought by the Recording Industry Association of America, the named plain-
tiffs obtain "nominal" relief).
187. E.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 506 F.2d 226, 237 (9th Cir. 1974) (of
the 400,000 members the plaintiffs claimed to be representing, only one sub-
mitted a claim).
188. Bartholomew, supra note 183, at 3248.
189. E.g., Eran B. Taussig, Broadening the Scope of Judicial Gatekeeping: Adopting
the Good Faith Doctrine in Class Action Proceedings, 83 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
1275, 1277 (2009) ("A vast body of literature has been written about the
problems and abuses of the class action procedure.").
190. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996).
191. E.g., Opderbeck, supra note 186, at 1688-89 ("Private attorney generals" is the
well-known term used to describe actions brought by private plaintiffs to en-
force laws that would, theoretically, go unenforced or at least under-enforced if
left to government action.).
192. See Bohn & Choi, supra note 190, at 906-07.
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wrongful corporate conduct" by bringing claims that would otherwise be too
small to pursue.1 93
In very broad strokes, the other side of the argument is that class action
is "a mechanism for plaintiffs' attorneys to extract rents from the corporate
treasuries of defendant firms and insurance companies."l94 Assume, argu-
endo, that there is some validity to this position-that small claims class
actions are an expensive and clumsy vehicle for redressing widespread but
minor economic injuries. Nonetheless, if the benefits of the class action vehi-
cle outweigh the negatives, there would be no justification for curtailing or
prohibiting the use of the class action. If the arguments in favor of the class
action are particularly weak in regard to certain types of corporate "wrongdo-
ing," however, the balance would be struck against using the class action for
these cases, in particular. What follows, then, is an analysis of the "wrongdo-
ing" that leads to compromises of personal information caused by hacks into
the data networks housing that information. An incident in which a company
accidently uploads files with personal customer data onto a publicly available
websitel95 is another issue and another discussion, entirely.
i. Are data breach defendants the "wrongdoers"?
In consumer data breach lawsuits arising from hacking, the defendant
company is not typically the true "wrongdoer."196 The cybercriminal who
hacks the database and then sells or uses the data is the true culprit. Of
course, a defendant can be liable for injury arising from criminal conduct if
the defendant's negligence is the initiating cause and the injury is reasonably
foreseeable.197 A landlord can be liable for a theft from a leased apartment of
the tenant's laptop computer if the landlord is negligent in providing security
measures for the apartment, and the theft is reasonably foreseeable.198 But in
the data breach cases, the thief has broken into the landlord's house and sto-
len the landlord's computer, which contains a tenant's personal information.
It is the company's property (databases and networks containing customers'
personal information but also potentially company trade secrets and other
193. Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the
Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT 755, 756 (2008).
194. Bohn & Choi, supra note 190, at 907.
195. See discussion supra Part II.A.
196. One of the named plaintiffs in the Heartland case objected to the settlement on
the grounds that, because the consumers had not actually been harmed by the
breach, the settlement was unfair to Heartland. In re Heartland Payment Sys.,
Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1050 (S.D. Tex.
2012).
197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 29, 33 (2010).
198. Id.
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confidential and business information) that has been breached.199 The com-
pany is the primary "victim."
The defendant company is also the main "victim" in other ways. It is the
company that becomes the target of nasty headlines, an FTC investigation,
and shareholder derivative actions. It is the company that pays the costs of
responding to the breach, repairing the breach, and notifying affected cus-
tomers. The company is the victim that incurs third-party costs, such as pay-
ments to credit card companies and higher premiums for security breach
insurance.2 00
The fact that both the breached company and its customers have been
injured does not and should not preclude assigning fault to the company if
the company's security measures were faulty. It should be noted, however,
that the efficacy of those security measures are, to some extent, a product of
external factors beyond a company's control.201 First, as noted in Part II.B,
the security technology specialists who install the data security software and
system are in short supply. Second, vulnerabilities in security software are
among the most common entry points for hackers.202 Companies purchasing
security software generally rely on the vendor for data protection. If that
protection fails, the breached company pays the piper and typically has little
or no recourse against the vendors who have contractual protections against
such liability.203 Further, the security software market is a consolidated mar-
ket, meaning that one vendor will serve a multitude of companies. Most
cyber security vendors promote customer success stories indicating that their
customers represent a vast array of industries and markets.204 All of those
companies have taken the same precautions against breach. Some of those
companies will be targeted, and others will be randomly hacked. The victim-
ized companies will be accused of negligence and other wrongful acts. One
might ask why, under these circumstances, only the unlucky few should be
called out in class action lawsuits. The responsibility for a breach may alter-
natively lie with parties other than the software vendor. The fault may, for
example, lie with the person who installs the software or links the software to
199. See S. REP. No. 114-32, at 3 ("Moreover, it is these same companies who are
the victims of malicious cyber activity, and their appropriate efforts to protect
themselves and other future victims from cyber threats should not only be au-
thorized but protected from unnecessary litigation.").
200. See generally supra Part II.C.2.
201. See Oriola, supra note 34, at 455.
202. See id. (discussing how "software vulnerabilities reputedly account for most of
the reported computer or network security problems"). But see Olavsrud, supra
note 82.
203. See Gilstrap, supra note 49, at 1272-73.
204. See, e.g., Customers, PALO ALTO NETWORKS, https://www.paloaltonetworks.
com/customers.html (last visited Jun. 2, 2016); see also Customers, SPLUNK,
http://www.splunk.com/enus/customers.htm (last visited Jun. 2, 2016).
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a network.205 Given this "complex set of interdependencies" comprising a
data security network, it is certainly not evident that the breached company
should bear the liability.206 But it is the breached company that becomes the
target for consumer lawsuits: Target and Sony are in the headlines and not
the external custodians of their security networks.
It is fair to assume that it is a well-known fact that security software can
fail. Thus, it might be argued that, in addition to diligently patching systems
for known vulnerabilities, all companies should take additional measures to
prevent breaches. This cost will presumably be passed to consumers.
Whether the additional cost is justifiable is uncertain. In contrast, what secur-
ity measures a landlord must employ depends largely on whether the leased
apartment is in a "high crime area." If the risk is high, the landlord is ex-
pected to account for this heightened risk. In the murky world of data breach,
attacks can be random and unpredictable.207 What is a "high crime" area is
impossible to determine. Generally, one might reasonably argue that data
breaches and subsequent harm to customers are "foreseeable" because of the
overall frequency of breach, but in the specific case of any one "landlord,"
perhaps not.
There is also the issue of causation when some measure of fault is as-
sumed. Regarding cause-in-fact, given that digitized personal information is
usually distributed widely (over the course of a year a consumer will swipe
her credit or debit card hundreds, if not thousands of times208), how likely is
it that any one fraudulent transaction can be securely linked to any one par-
ticular breach?209 When a card is swiped, the data could be hacked by the
clerk handling the card, if not by a criminal hacker. That breach may never
be detected or, if detected, never reported.
Legal criteria could surely be devised to assign liability to one of the
entities through whose networks the digital information has passed.210 For
example, the old common law rule, which applies when a plaintiff has clearly
205. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 53, at 328-29.
206. For example, Target and Sony are in the headlines for bearing liability, but they
are not the external custodians of their security networks. Id. at 329.
207. See Bambauer, supra note 56 ("Additionally, information asymmetry means
that defenders are always behind.").
208. Panel Round One (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.npr.org/
2015/12/19/460332256/panelroundone (stating that during a heavy shopping
season, a card may be swiped dozens of times over a very short period of time,
leaving a "trail of personal information" while shopping for the holidays).
209. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (re-
jecting this argument when raised by the defendant Neiman Marcus, but in a
different context and based on a different standard: the issue was whether the
injury was "fairly traceable" to the data breach for showing standing to sue).
210. E.g., Resnick v. Avmed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1327 (1lth Cir. 2012) (stating
that courts are adopting approximate time limitations between the date of the
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been injured but the specific wrongdoer cannot be identified, could govern. 211
The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to prove that the information
was not stolen from its databases. But in the interconnected data world, one
might fairly question whether this is fair and reasonable. On occasion, the
answer may be yes, as when a criminal investigation uncovers a massive
scheme to hack a specific set of data from a particular company in order to
obtain contact information of specific investors.212 But for the run-of-the-mill
data breach from a retail store, it seems mostly a guess as to whether the
breach giving rise to a lawsuit caused the subsequent identity thefts, or
whether these resulted from some other data transfer.
Proximate cause is also problematic. As noted above, very little is actu-
ally known about what cybercriminals do with all the purloined data unless a
criminal investigation brings it to light for a particular case.213 Arguably, the
"standard" injuries-credit and debit card fraud, opening of fraudulent ac-
counts, and damaged credit ratings-are reasonably foreseeable. But when
other, more "exotic" damage occurs, such as the "pump and dump" security
fraud devised by the hackers of JPMorgan Chase's data,214 the breached com-
pany might legitimately be as surprised as the injured customer.
And finally, what responsibility should the customer bear? Today, it
would be the unusual customer who is unaware that digitized personal infor-
mation is readily transferrable and replicable, persists forever, and can easily
be accessed.215 This is not to say that consumers voluntarily assume the entire
risk of data compromise when they exchange their personal data for goods
and services, but it is at least a known risk. It could therefore be argued that
customers voluntarily surrender at least some fraction of their security and
privacy for convenience by storing their credit card number with the vendor
instead of using alternative, "safer" (but often significantly less convenient)
payment methods. Further, given the number of publicized data breaches, a
rational person should at least entertain the possibility that he or she might
become a victim of a data breach. Perhaps it is not unfair to expect customers
to accept some rather minor, unpleasant consequences as a necessary cost of
convenience. After all, the faint of heart could purchase individual identity
theft insurance, and any customer notified of a data breach should be ex-
pected to take appropriate steps to mitigate harm. According to the 2015
Identity Fraud Report issued by Javelin Research & Consulting, two-thirds of
breach and the date of the unlawful use of the data, beyond which causation is
too speculative).
211. E.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1., 5 (Cal. 1948).
212. Shahani, supra note 79.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 53, at 321 ("The growing number of
press articles on security issues should increase awareness among consumers
and small businesses.").
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identity fraud victims had received notification of a data breach.216 Perhaps
nothing could have been done to prevent the initial data compromise from
becoming data misuse. But perhaps too many just did not take the time to do
anything to protect themselves from harm.
ii. Are these lawsuits necessary?
It is with some hesitancy that one leaps into the discussion of whether
data breach lawsuits are an appropriate means of encouraging companies to
employ better data security systems. The answer depends, fundamentally, on
one great unknown: whether the threat of a lawsuit, and its attendant public-
ity and costs, are significant factors for corporate decision makers in choos-
ing security products.217 But a few other considerations suggest. that private
lawsuits may be an impediment to improving data security, at worse, and in
any event largely unnecessary, at least in light of the associated costs.
First, effective data security requires continual innovation. Measures
that encourage companies to share information about perceived and actual
security threats, and to cooperate in developing new technologies, are likely
to improve data security for all.218 For example, Google in July 2014 intro-
duced Project Zero, a program that uncovers, reports, and fixes previously
undisclosed computer software vulnerabilities.219 But the threat of litigation
may weaken overall data security by discouraging companies from sharing
security vulnerabilities.220 A company is not likely to disclose information on
a security "failure" when that information could be used as evidence of negli-
gence. 221 Thus, "the specter of litigation for monitoring a company's own
216. Al Pascual, 2015 Identity Fraud: Protecting Vulnerable Populations, JAVELIN
STRATEGY & REs. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-
area/2015-identity-fraud-protecting-vulnerable-populations.
217. A related issue not directly addressed here is whether equitable remedies ob-
tained by settlement or judgment requiring a company to install and maintain
specific security measures significantly improves data security.
218. See S. REP. No. 114-32, at 2 (The Committee for the Cybersecurity Informa-
tion Sharing Act (CISA) believes that "such increased sharing will drive public
and private sector cybersecurity efforts to develop key new technologies and
processes.").
219. See Chris Evans, Announcing Project Zero, GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG
(July 15, 2014), https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.de/2014/07/announcing-
project-zero.html.
220. E.g., Romanosky et al., supra note 24, at 75 ("On the other hand, a heavy-
handed litigation regime could impose excessive legal fees and damage awards
and-according to some-stifle innovation.").
221. Cf., Philip G. Peters, Jr., A Tribute to Professor David Fischer: Resuscitating
Hospital Enterprise Liability, 73 Mo. L. REV. 369, 381 (2008) (arguing that
medical malpractice reform would foster a "blame free" environment that
would encourage disclosure of mistakes and errors).
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networks or sharing cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for cyber-
security purposes has disincentivized private sector cybersecurity efforts."222
Also, a data security system comprises many distinct entities: security
software programmers and vendors, system auditors, and ISPs, in addition to
the company in the business of collecting and using consumer data. Imposing
liability on the wrong party, or only on the business, "could result in weaker
overall security by undermining incentives to take precautions."223
Second, companies have strong incentives, unrelated to litigation, to
devote money and resources to employing effective security measures. One
incentive is that businesses must invest in data security measures to protect
their own data, including trade secrets and other proprietary information.224
Another incentive is the cost incurred by a breached entity when responding
to a breach. 225 As discussed in Part II.C, this cost is substantial.226 The cost of
notification alone is an incentive for preventing breach. Thus, "the cost of
breach notification, in hard dollars and reputation damage, has tended to fo-
cus the attention of top management and shareholders on data privacy and
security practices."227 Avoiding a breach is in a company's financial best
interest, regardless of the threat posed to companies from consumer class
actions. There are, no doubt, financial and other reasons for companies to
"cut corners," or even consciously refrain from employing certain security
measures because too much security can harm the business.228 But a com-
222. S. REP. No. 114-32, at 3.
223. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 53, at 328.
224. Id. at 323-24 ("Many firms, however, do appear to have significant incentives
to protect their systems. Companies with truly vital systems generally 'air gap'
them-meaning that those systems are not linked directly to public networks
and are therefore not exposed to externalities in security. Others with valuable
databases and sensitive files have strong incentives to protect their networks
from attack in order to guard their investments and their reputations.").
225. This fact seems overlooked when it is claimed that only the individuals whose
personal information has been compromised directly incur harm, and when it is
argued that companies are therefore dis-incentivized to spend appropriate
amounts on data security. E.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger:
The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age,
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 264-66 (2007).
226. A portion of these costs arises directly from legal obligations imposed on the
company: notifying customers of the breach, reimbursing for fraudulent credit
card charges, replacing credit and debit cards, and etc. A failure to comply with
these obligations could also result in a lawsuit or regulatory enforcement ac-
tion. So the threat of litigation is certainly not irrelevant. What is discussed in
text is the separate deterrent effect of a private consumer lawsuit arising from
the breach itself.
227. Harris, supra note 63, at 1.
228. E.g., Jose Pagliery, Why Retailers Aren't Protecting You From Hackers, CNN
MONEY (Feb. 18, 2014, 6:56 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/18/technol
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pany's failure to prevent a breach does not closely fit the classic paradigm of
"corporate misconduct" that class actions are intended to deter: cutting safety
features on a design of a car to manufacture and sell it more cheaply, for
example.229 In data breach situations, the corporate executives are passengers
in the car.2 30
But what of those companies that do cut corners, or simply cannot af-
ford the costs of an adequate data security system? Are class actions still
needed because of their role in "uncovering" specific instances of corporate
misconduct?231 To some extent, the data breach notification statutes accom-
plish this objective. These statutes have "opened a window on privacy and
security practices."232 Certain types of breaches must be reported. When and
how a breach must be reported varies by jurisdiction. Thus, full disclosure of
breaches can never be assumed. Whether a company has fully and fairly dis-
closed such breaches should be monitored. But strengthening these statutes
and having regulatory oversight of compliance could, perhaps, well serve the
goal of deterring breaches. Ensuring that consumers are notified of a breach
would also further enable consumers to take "self-help" measures to prevent
or mitigate damage, which in turn would reduce the need to race to the
courthouse.
Another consideration, in assessing whether class actions are a needed
inducement to protect customer data, is that many companies are subject to
specific regulatory requirements. For certain industries, the requirements are
fairly specific. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial
institutions to develop a written information security plan describing how
their program protects consumer information.233 Similarly, entities covered
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act are required to safely dispose of consumer
reports. 234 Even general retailers are subject to Federal Trade Commission
ogy/security/retail-hack/ (explaining that if credit card systems are improved in
order to better protect data from hackers, then retailers will no longer have
access to information used for marketing purposes, which increase retailer re-
turns by as much as sixty percent; furthermore, the cost to banks and retailers
in implementing more secure technology is estimated to cost upwards of eight
billion dollars).
229. This is a reference to the infamous Ford Pinto case.
230. In fact, it is generally assumed in the industry that companies employ stricter
security measures on customer and client data than on corporate data: the cus-
tomers are in the safest seat in the car.
231. Bohn & Choi, supra note 190, at 948 n.153.
232. Harris, supra note 63, at iii (under Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82, for example, the
state obtains information on the types of breach, what "vulnerabilities" the
breaches reveal, and what action might be taken to protect against future
breaches).
233. See Rosenfeld & McDowell, supra note 9, at 90.
234. Id.
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enforcement actions if the company has "engaged in unfair or deceptive trade
practices that put consumers' privacy at unreasonable risk."235 Between 2002
and 2014, FTC brought fifty such actions.236
Lastly, one might question how, exactly, does the threat of a private
lawsuit motivate companies (those that are not obviously "bad apples") to do
more than they are already doing? Just how much more is society willing to
pay in an effort to prevent fraudulent credit and debit card charges? That is,
fundamentally, what the Target, Anthem, and the Home Depot lawsuits are
all about: those companies didn't do enough to prevent a few dollars in indi-
vidual harm. Litigation costs time and money. 237 If the parties settle, the cost
of attorneys' fees; the cost of employee time spent on investigating, respond-
ing to allegations in the complaint, and responding to discovery requests; the
cost of expert witness fees; and other pre-settlement costs must be added to
the cost of administering the proceeds. For example, Heartland probably
spent $160,000 per valid claim made while administering that settlement
fund, including the cost of notifying claimants of the settlement, for a mere
$175 payout to each victim.238 Such a process expends judicial resources.
Some portion of costs to the company defendant will be passed down to
consumers, and taxpayers will shoulder the costs of the courthouse.239 Per-
haps it is time to divert the resources spent on this effort elsewhere. While
these musings may not justify a wholesale jettisoning of civil liability on the
part of breached entities, some re-thinking of liability is warranted.
C. Lessons Learned
Targeted changes to state law claims for data breach-negligence and
state statutory claims such as alleged "unfair trade practices"-could perhaps
better account for some of the peculiar aspects of the data breach noted
above. Given that "culpability" on the part of the breached entity may often
235. FED. TRADE COMM'N, 2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE (2014), https://
www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2014.
236. Id.
237. See Cyrus Farivar, Target's $10M Settlement in Data Breach Lawsuit is a Tiny
Price to Pay, ARs TECHNICA ONLINE (Mar. 19, 2015, 3:30 PM), http:/arstech
nica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/targets- lOm-settlement-in-data-breach-lawsuit-
is-a-tiny-price-to-pay (But for attorneys' fees and other costs related to litiga-
tion, one might question the power of data breach lawsuits to affect corporate
action. A $10 million settlement offer conditionally approved in the Target case
is a "miniscule amount" relative to the company's overall revenues.).
238. Goldman, supra note 182.
239. E.g., John Burnett, Smartphone industry is exposed to senseless litigation that
may cost consumers, THE HILL (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/congress-blog/technology/222718-smartphone-industry-is-exposed-to-
senseless-litigation-that (discussing how litigation costs for smart phone com-
panies are passed from the companies to the consumers).
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be tenuous, liability concerning the protection of consumer personal data
could be restricted to instances where a company was "grossly negligence"
or "reckless." Alternatively, liability could be restricted to data breaches re-
sulting from "insider" misconduct (e.g., hacking by an employee or consult-
ant or the loss of equipment housing personal data) on the theory that the
company has, or should have, control over the conduct of insiders, but not
over cybercriminals. That the company promptly and fully complied with the
applicable data breach notification statute might be an affirmative defense.
Although difficult, it would be worth considering an attempt to craft some
reasonable definition of causation (e.g., a specific time limit between the
breach and the occurrence of harm beyond which causation is presumed to be
absent).
Whether any of these issues relating to liability are pursued, a related
but separate objective would remain unmet: individuals that are truly injured
by a data breach should be fairly and adequately compensated. The class
action model, as discussed above, does not appear well suited to accomplish-
ing this goal; it is expensive and under compensates the consumer victims of
a breach. Two years after notice of the breach, a consumer with an uncom-
pensated fraudulent charge of $50 is unlikely (if the results noted above are
indicative) to go through the trouble of dealing with a settlement claim form,
if it even arrives. The single mother with a minimum wage job whose credit
rating is compromised by an identity theft will lose her apartment before the
class action of which she is a member can be concluded. For the vast major-
ity of those injured, opting-out of the slow-moving class action to pursue an
individual lawsuit to seek compensation is wholly impractical because the
dollar amount of the loss is too small.
A data breach compensation fund would better meet the goal of com-
pensating true victims. It could be argued, however, that the cost of adminis-
tering such a fund is just not worth the candle. Given the small percentage of
persons actually victimized following a large-scale data breach, the nominal
amount of monetary harm those victims actually incur, and the "self-help"
mechanisms already in place so that even nominal harm might be avoided by
the putative victim, is there even a need for any public compensation
method? Perhaps not, but at least three reasons suggest the benefits might
outweigh the cost. First, as noted above, although the median loss may be
quite small, a significant number of individuals lose thousands of dollars and
spend hundreds of hours remediating the theft. And for some low-wage earn-
ers or young persons, even a small loss could be significant to the family
budget. Second, what the hackers will do next is anybody's guess. Actual
damage to consumers may balloon following data breaches in the near future.
Having a functioning compensation scheme in place, albeit one that would
have to be significantly bolstered to deal with different types of claims, might
be a wise precautionary measure. Finally, some external incentive to protect
consumer data, above and beyond self-interest, may well be advisable so as
to discourage the cost-cutters and "bad apples" who shirk their data security
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responsibilities.240 If properly designed, an administered compensation fund
could serve this deterrent function by requiring only those companies that
have engaged in specific "wrongdoing" to fund the program, while avoiding
some of the objections to imposing liability discussed above.241
IV. THE DATA BREACH COMPENSATION FUND
This section begins with a brief overview of administered compensation
funds. Part B focuses on victim compensation funds created by statute and
proposes that key characteristics of the underlying issues that strengthened
the political will to enact these funds are found in personal data security
breaches. This means that the creation of a data breach compensation fund, at
least at the state or on a pilot basis, may be politically feasible. Part C sug-
gests, in broad strokes, how such a fund might be designed.
A. Administered Compensation Funds
Administered compensation funds come in different flavors. Effectively,
private and public insurance against the eventuality of certain losses are one
type of administered compensation fund. Social welfare funds, such as Social
Security and Medicare, are another type; these are funded with taxpayer dol-
lars and administered by the federal Social Security Administration.242 An-
other example is a fund created in settlement of litigation from which
payments are made pursuant to an administered payout proceeding, such as
the Tobacco Litigation Settlement Fund.243 Another type, and the model
which is proposed here, is a creature of statute, funded at least in part by
private industry in exchange for immunity from or limitations on civil liabil-
ity, to pay for injuries caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions of a
company.
Such an administrated system is a well recognized compensation alter-
native to private litigation.244 The benefit of an administrated compensation
method over private litigation is primarily that the former can be designed to
240. E.g., Pagliery, Why Retailers Aren't Protecting You From Hackers, supra note
228.
241. See Yoo, supra note 113, at 47 (recommending a compensation fund adminis-
tered by the FTC for victims of data breach, but this concept was not explored
in any detail in the Yoo article).
242. See, e.g., How is Medicare funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare
.gov/about-us/how-medicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited Jun.
2,2016).
243. Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and To-
bacco Litigation, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 897, 898 (1998).
244. E.g., Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 39, at 483 ("The best known non-tort
compensation method is an administrative compensation system that com-
pletely replaces tort.").
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make compensation simpler and more efficient.245 Who and how much
should be paid can be straightforward and less adversarial. 246
A fund can compensate more fairly than litigation.247 From the point of
view of the victim, making a claim can be simple and inexpensive for several
reasons: (1) it is relatively simple to determine whether making a claim is
justified;248 (2) the claimant will know, in advance, within reasonable limits,
what to expect;249 (3) claim resolution will be prompt; (4) a fund avoids the
cumbersome processes and slow-turning wheels of justice dispensed through
litigation; and (5) satisfaction of the claim is not dependent on external forces
over which the victim has no control, such as which party has access to the
best expert witnesses, or a jury's secret deliberations.250 In short, an adminis-
tered fund can "cover more cases, faster, more efficiently, and more predict-
ably than tort-so as to improve compensation." 251
An administered system can also be fairer to companies. Determining
which companies will pay into the fund and under what circumstances can be
defined in advance, eliminating the somewhat random odds that one or two
in a sector will be named in a lawsuit, while others-equally blameworthy-
245. For one thing, if payment is made on a "no-fault" basis, the entire liability
phase of a trial is omitted, and there would be little or no need for any evidence
regarding the events leading up to the data breach. See Janet Cooper Alexander,
Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627,
645 (2003) (discussing the procedural design of the 9/11 Victims' Compensa-
tion Fund); Betsy J. Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief: A Proposal
for a Permanent Compensation System for Domestic Terrorist Victims, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 663, 720 (2006) (An administered fund "saves litiga-
tion costs for both plaintiffs and defendants, avoids duplicate litigation of iden-
tical or nearly identical issues, and reduces the burden on the judicial system.").
246. See Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fif-
teen, 56 FooD & DRUG L.J. 351, 362 (2001) (though the defendant's antagonis-
tic positioning has been removed from the process, some adversity may remain,
as between the administrators, who must appropriately distribute a limit fund,
and claimants).
247. E.g., Grey, supra note 245, at 669.
248. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vac-
cine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 396 (1987) (the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986, discussed below, provides a table that makes it relatively simple to deter-
mine whether an injury is vaccine-related).
249. See Alexander, supra note 245, at 648 ("By contrast, tort plaintiffs must prove
liability, bear the risk that the jury may find against them in the liability phase,
pay attorneys fees from any recovery (unless unusual circumstances permit fee-
shifting), and enforce the judgment.").
250. See id.
251. Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 39, at 483.
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are spared. Compensation awards, and therefore business costs, can be more
reliably predicted.
Because of the advantages, administered compensation funds have been
proposed as a replacement to litigation that arises from medical malprac-
tice,252 defective products,25 3 and terrorism,254 to name but a few. However,
few of these proposals are enacted, at least not on a large scale.255 The rea-
sons some proposals fail are no doubt many, complex, and overlapping. Yet
the same is ostensibly true for those proposals that are adopted. In other
words, as summarized below, some of the better-known statutory funds ap-
pear to address vastly different kinds of victims and injuries, offer immunity
from civil litigation to different industries for different reasons, and have
sprung from differing political climates. A closer comparison of these funds
reveals common underlying features that are perhaps shared with data breach
victims, however, and that are analogous to the causes and consequences of
data breach.
B. The Victims' Compensation Fund
Workers' compensation is the "three hundred pound gorilla" amongst
victims' compensation funds. In very brief summary, early in the twentieth
century, a "rising tide" of concern arose over the disturbing increase in the
number of injured and disabled workers consequent to the industrial revolu-
tion.256 Factory work was dangerous, and many were injured. Increasingly,
injured employees sought compensation through private litigation, which
brought a measure of relief to a limited number of individuals.257 But the
outcomes were unpredictable; employees suffered inadequate measure of
compensation, and employers, likewise, faced uncertain threats of liability
from which they advocated relief.258 From this, the "historic compromise"
252. See, e.g., David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Beyond Dead Reckoning:
Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative
Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REV. 1643, 1672
(2000) (discussing a number of such proposals); Michelle M. Mello et al., Pol-
icy Experimentation with Administrative Compensation for Medical Injury: Is-
sues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 61 (2008).
253. S. REP. No. 99-422 (1986).
254. See generally, Grey, supra note 245, at 719.
255. See, e.g., Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000-5021 (West 2016) (exemplifies the more common
approach of establishing a compensation fund for a selected sub-class of inju-
ries or injured persons).
256. See Emily A. Spicier, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Comp. and the Persistence
of Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REV. 119, 162-63 (1994).
257. See id. at 163.
258. See id. at 167.
40 [Vol. XIX
Your Personal Data Is at Risk
was born.259 States enacted workers' compensation legislation requiring em-
ployers to purchase insurance to cover employee claims; generally, employee
claims for unintentional injuries incurred on the job would be paid regardless
of fault, and general immunity from civil liability would be granted to
employers. 260
Similarly, the National Childhood Vaccination Compensation Fund
(NCVCF),261 enacted in 1986, created a mandatory no-fault compensation
system for persons injured through childhood vaccines. 262 Although the
widespread administration of vaccinations against many childhood diseases
(e.g., whooping cough, diphtheria, tetanus, and others) had been "spectacu-
larly effective" in improving public health,263 in rare cases, these vaccines
caused injury, and even death.264 Faced with an increasing number of law-
suits,265 some of the vaccine manufacturers ceased production. As a result,
the NCVCF was established to ensure the availability of the life-saving vac-
cinations. 266 The NCVCF is funded by a surcharge on exported pharmaceuti-
cals, and while it limits, it does not eliminate liability.267 To make a claim, a
victim must first apply to the fund administrator; if unsatisfied, the victim
may then appeal to the courts where some deference will be given to the fund
administrator.2 68
The 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund moved quickly through Con-
gress, as the nation was eager to show support and compassion for the vic-
tims of the terrorist attack, and legislators had become convinced of the
wisdom of limiting the liability of the airline carriers who were already reel-
ing from a reduction in airplane travel following the attacks.269 The airline
industry provided a significant portion of the funds (though taxpayers also
contributed) in exchange for restrictions on liability to the victim: victims
could apply for compensation through the fund or choose to go to court, but
259. Id. at 168.
260. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and the Econ. Struc-
ture of Workers' Comp. Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 776-79 (1982).
261. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 33 (1986).
262. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 248, at 387.
263. Id. at 388.
264. See id.
265. See Scott, supra note 246, at 355 ("Plaintiffs were filing over 100 new cases
annually, requesting damages of over $ 3.5 billion, and manufacturers were
struggling to pay damages and defense costs.").
266. See id.
267. See id. at 356-57.
268. See id. at 362.
269. See generally Robert M. Ackerman, The Sept. 11th Victim Comp. Fund: An
Effective Admin. Response to Nat'l Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135
(2005).
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if the latter was chosen, the statute capped liability to the amount of the
defending carrier's insurance coverage. 270
One thing disparate funds seem to have in common is a characteristic of
the victims: their harms were unexpected and were not a result of their own
actions. This essential "victimhood" justifies special efforts to ensure that
these individuals receive efficient and fair compensation. The unfortunate
few include victims of injury in the workplace; families and children suffer-
ing from the effects of childhood vaccination; those who died in the South
Tower; and the emergency responders potentially exposed to disease as a
necessary consequence of their jobs. At the time workers' compensation stat-
utes were enacted, workplace injuries were considered "necessary exigen-
cies" of one's daily occupation, over which one had no control, such that it
would be unjust for those workers to bear the burden.271 Most children have
to be vaccinated in order to attend public school,272 and because "state gov-
ernments require children to undergo a risk in order to protect society as a
whole," Congress found it appropriate to create "a national fund to compen-
sate children who are injured because of these risks."273 The victims of 9/11
"were believed to have died on behalf of all Americans, creating a justifiable,
communitarian sense that the loss should not fall disproportionately on those
who were unfortunate enough to occupy the targets at the fatal moment."274
By way of contrast, an individual has at least some measure of control in
deciding whether to have a medical procedure and a choice in the provider.
Similarly, an individual can choose to purchase a Ford or a GM car, or
forego an automobile in favor of public transportation. While some victims
are-fairly or unfairly-labeled mere money-seekers by tort reformers,275 it
is not easy to characterize the victims of 9/11 in the same manner. Nor is it
palatable to leave the entire cost of their injuries on those few children who
reacted poorly to vaccines, when those vaccinations have benefitted all of
society by creating "herd immunity."276
270. Id. at 143, 145.
271. SpieIer, supra note 256, at 165-66 (quoting Theodore Roosevelt).
272. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 248, at 393. In most states an exception
will be made for a religious or "personal" objection by the parents, though
these exclusions are currently under fire; see Vaccine Laws, NAT'L VACCINE
INFO. CTR., http://www.nvic.org/vaccine-laws.aspx (last visited Jun. 2, 2016).
273. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 248, at 393.
274. Ackerman, supra note 269, at 159.
275. Id. at 158 (discussing the characterization of tort reformers).
276. Scott, supra note 246, at 359 ("The notion of herd immunity, in which society
bears the cost of vaccine injuries because compulsory immunization lessens the
risk that the disease can be introduced and harm members of the community, is
given as one of the major reasons why society, and not manufacturers, should
be responsible for injuries incurred when vaccines are administered.").
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Related to the notion of "true victimhood" is the fact that while many
people were in harm's way, only a few were harmed. For example, although
millions of children have received vaccinations,277 only a very small number
were seriously injured.278 In addition, 9/11 was considered a terrorist attack
on America; the unlucky few were the Americans who died or were in-
jured.27 9 The perception that "we are all in this together" could have been a
factor in mobilizing political support for these funds.280
A second common factor is that these compensation funds protect puta-
tive defendants from civil liability from "wrongful" acts or omissions when
the primary causative agent was a force, largely or entirely, out of the de-
fendants' control. During the height of the Industrial Revolution, when work-
ers' compensation statutes were enacted, "[i]ndustrial carnage was almost
universally viewed as an inevitable, albeit unfortunate, consequence of mod-
em industrial enterprise."281 The grinding machinery, not the employer, was
the primary cause of injury, but one that had to be endured to turn the wheels
of commerce. 282 The vaccines that saved so many childrens' lives posed an
"unavoidable" risk of harm to a few, due to the characteristics of the orga-
nisms comprising the vaccine, not a design or manufacturing defect.283 The
airlines whose planes were hijacked on 9/11 may have been secondarily lia-
ble for negligence, but it was the awful acts of terrorism that loomed in peo-
ples' minds. Otherwise stated, the injuries to the individual victims might
have been preventable, but at an inordinate cost.
Finally, in each of these programs there is a clear "triggering" event for
distribution from the fund.284 With documentation showing the administra-
tion of a vaccination within a specified period prior to the onset of symp-
toms, a claim can be made to the NCVCF.285 Eligible claimants for
compensation from the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund were persons at the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or Shanksville, Pennsylvania at the time,
or in the immediate aftermath, of the plane crashes.286 A triggering event may
277. See id. at 352 (reporting that in 1997 coverage among children exceeded 90%
for the DPT vaccine).
278. Id. at 353.
279. Ackerman, supra note 269, at 159.
280. See id.
281. Spieler, supra note 256, at 164.
282. Since the turn of the twentieth century, society's acceptance of this "inevitabil-
ity" has changed considerably, and employers are expected to provide a reason-
ably safe environment for employees. See id. at 162-64.
283. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 248, at 388.
284. See id. at 396 (contrasting the NCVCF with contemporaneous proposals to es-
tablish a compensation fund for consumers injured by defective products).
285. Scott, supra note 246, at 355-56.
286. Ackerman, supra note 269, at 160.
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not seem, at first blush, to be a characteristic of employees injured on the job:
the number of direct causes of injury is probably close to infinite. But from a
bird's-eye view, there is a universal, indirect cause. All were injured because
of their employment, and that is a sufficient cause-no more precise cause
need be identified-to entitle the employee to seek compensation. Although
the employee may not be able to establish that the injury was a consequence
of employment rather than a result of any intentional misconduct, ultimately,
eligibility to seek workers' compensation depends only on that one element:
employment.
These three underlying features of established compensation funds can
also be discerned in the background of data breaches. In terms of true "vic-
timhood," individual consumers have had no real ability to prevent a breach
of their personal information. A handful of Americans may be able to con-
duct their lives without the use of any transaction in which digitized personal
identification is exchanged for goods and services, but there are not many of
those folks. This also means that the potential risk of harm from compro-
mised data is virtually universal. We are, indeed, in this together.
In terms of culpability, when a company's data, including the personal
information of the company's customers or clients, has been hacked, the pri-
mary liability rests with the unknown thief. The company could be held sec-
ondarily liable for the theft but, as discussed above, there are many reasons to
be extremely judicious in defining "fault."287 Otherwise stated, these reasons
might justify a "pressure release mechanism" in the form of a no-fault, ad-
ministered claims procedure as an alternative or pre-condition to civil
liability.288
And finally, the "triggering" event can be readily defined; the compro-
mise of personal data by an actor outside the immediate control of the
breached entity. Thus, it may be politically feasible to explore the possibility
of creating a data breach victims' compensation fund.289
287. See generally supra Part II.B.1.
288. See George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112
PENN. ST. L. REV. 175, 252 (2007) (justifying the limitations on the airlines'
liability in the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund).
289. Presumably, as with the data breach notification statutes, these efforts would
begin in the states. A national fund may at some point be preferable, given the
national reach and/or data interconnectedness of business today. See generally
Peters, supra note 13. But this seems improbable in the foreseeable future
given the general political polarization in the Federal Congress during this era,
and its demonstrated failure to pass any significant data security legislation
over the past decade. And a state-based solution does have advantages: smaller
scale, more flexibility, and different models can be tried, compared, and
revised.
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C. A Data Breach Victims Compensation Fund
Many potential issues exist in designing a compensation fund. Such is-
sues range from the fund's structural composition, such as how the program
will be administered and by whom, to eligibility, claims procedures, measure
of damages, and the process for review of awards.290 The discussion below is
limited to the two primary objectives of a compensation fund-limiting lia-
bility, and providing expeditious and fair compensation2 91-and proposes
how one might best accomplish those two objectives.
The data breach victims' compensation fund should be a no-fault alter-
native to remedies based on state tort claims, breach of contract, and con-
sumer protection statutes. 292 The compensation fund would require individual
data breach victims to file a claim with the fund before filing a lawsuit di-
rectly against the breached entity; the victim would be free to pursue a law-
suit directly against the hacker.293 An alternative to this pure "exhaustion"
requirement is to give victims the option of making a claim or proceeding
directly to court. 294 This design functions, at least partially, to ensure that the
fund is not a "get-out-of-jail free" card for those companies who do not im-
plement reasonable security measures. 295 But this design is only feasible
when a finite number of potential victims arising from a singular occurrence
exist, or a limited number of incidents exist,296 because if the events giving
rise to harm are ongoing, giving victims this option leaves the courthouse
door wide open to class action and other lawsuits;297 this would defeat the
purpose of the fund.298
A better solution would be to identify those companies whose data
breaches were most preventable, as defined below, and tax these with fund-
ing the program; this would incorporate both pure no-fault as a basis for
compensation and a penalty for some measure of fault.299 At this time, the tax
should not create an inordinate financial burden for the companies. Based on
290. Alexander, supra note 245, at 662.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 683.
293. Id. at 671 (". . . the compensation program is a substitute for tort litigation
against the protected entities, but not others.") This exclusion might have little
practical consequence, but there would surely be instances in which a hacker
claimed responsibility or was caught by the authorities and was subject to ser-
vice of process.
294. Conk, supra note 288, at 220.
295. See id. at 252.
296. See id. at 253-54.
297. See id. at 255-58.
298. See id. at 258.
299. See id. at 197-98, 259.
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the available data on the number of persons who incur a direct loss on ac-
count of a data breach, and the average amount of that loss, the total amount
needed to fund the program should be reasonably modest, even if all injured
parties actually filed a claim,300 which seems highly unlikely.301 It would be
an additional cost to the compensation fund or taxpayers if public investiga-
tors were designated to evaluate large-scale breaches to determine whether
the breached entity should be subject to this fund tax.302 However, public
investigation would be limited, because data breach notification statutes re-
quire companies to disclose the breach.3 03 There would be no need, therefore,
to determine whether a crime had occurred, a regulation had been violated, or
to ascertain the identity of the culprit.304 If the notification statutes were to
require sufficient detail about the circumstances of the breach, costs could be
reduced by further streamlining investigations.305
To facilitate investigations intended to determine whether a fund tax is
owed, and to avoid the unfairness of imposing liability "wholesale" discussed
above,306 liability could be limited to pre-determined "avoidable classes of
events."307 Specifically, a breach caused by an act or omission of the com-
pany housing the data that caused a highly-preventable breach (taking into
account the costs of protecting against breach, available technologies, the
nature of the industry, etc., as agreed by data security experts) would give
rise to a fine to be paid into the fund.308 Alternatively, or in addition, fines
from civil actions taken by state authorities against companies that fail to
comply with data breach notification statutes could also be dedicated to the
compensation fund.309
300. Conk, supra note 288, at 259; see also discussion supra Part II.B.1.
301. See discussion supra Part III.A.
302. See id.; see also First-of-its-kind lawsuit for unnecessary delay in data breach
notices, McDONALD HoPKINS ALERT (Mar. 18, 2014), https://mcdonaldhopkins
.com/Insights/Alerts/2014/03/18/Data-Privacy-and-Cybersecurity-Alert-First-
of-its-kind-lawsuit-for-unnecessary-delay-in-data-breach-notices.
303. See First-of-its-kind lawsuit for unnecessary delay in data breach notices,
supra note 302.
304. See id
305. See id. The California data breach notification may come closest to meeting
this objective. Most such states' statutes would, however, as currently written,
not provide sufficient information. See Pagliery, Why Retailers Aren't Protect-
ing You From Hackers, supra note 228.
306. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
307. Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 39, at 485.
308. See id. at 482 (defining "ACE's" in the context of medical malpractice).
309. See First-of-its-kind lawsuit for unnecessary delay in data breach notices,
supra note 302.
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The question of eligibility should be straightforward. Anyone would be
eligible to file a claim as long as their personally identifiable digital data has
been compromised by a hacking incident into the computers or networks of
an entity that regularly collects and houses that data for ordinary business
purposes. The notice provided by that entity pursuant to a data breach notifi-
cation statute would substantiate eligibility. Those persons living in the three
states without such legislation who are the victims of breach might turn to
one of the number of private services that compile publicly available lists of
data breaches.
It is proposed that only out-of-pocket losses should be compensable,
which include non-reimbursed fraudulent debit or credit transactions or other
direct charges, any actual costs incurred in replacing cards or contacting ser-
vice providers to change account information, and documented time spent
repairing the consequences of the data compromise with a set hourly rate and
upper limit on the number of hours that could be claimed. Only costs directly
associated with the breach should be compensable. Thus, mitigation ex-
penses, such as the purchase of a credit monitoring service, would not be
compensated, since these costs are voluntarily assumed by the data breach
victim. Including these as compensable damages would inordinately increase
the complexity and cost of administering the fund: more documentation
would have to be collected and more judgments would have to be made
about the validity and reasonableness of the amount claimed. In addition,
given the other mitigation measures already in place and the fact that the
chance of being an actual victim as a result of a large-scale breach is quite
small, incurring the cost of credit monitoring services is basically a wild
"shot in the dark," and not a reasonable expense that should be compensated.
Alleged injury from future harm, such as an increased risk of identity
theft, should not be compensable.310 First, any method of setting a "dollars
and cents" amount to such a claim would be no better than a wild guess.
Second, and again, it is not very likely that the "future harm" will ever actu-
ally come to pass. Finally, if an individual's personal information is misused
sometime in the future (presumably some significant period of time after the
breach for which compensation is sought) then it is entirely possible that the
information was stolen from another source.
As for "emotional distress" resulting from the data compromise itself,311
this alleged injury should ordinarily not be compensable from the fund. This
follows from the evaluation of this type of injury in the law of torts. Not just
any slight or hurt, unaccompanied by physical harm, is a compensable event.
Instead, there must be shown the existence of "severe emotional distress"
caused by truly outrageous conduct. Certainly hacking is a crime, and it may
surely be considered despicable and underhanded, but "outrageous"? One
310. Whether or not these should confer legal standing is a separate issue not ad-
dressed in this article.
311. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2015)
(showing injuries commonly alleged by data breach plaintiffs).
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would think ordinarily not. On the other side of the equation, one could im-
agine limited exceptions, but the threat of a loss of $99 would surely not
cause the ordinary person "severe emotional distress."
Thus set, the parameters for compensation from the fund would largely
parallel those that are often part of the terms of a litigation settlement agree-
ment: out-of-pocket losses directly caused by the breach are compensable.312
This, it seems, just makes sense: the compensation fund would be, in effect, a
generalized "settlement agreement" between consumers and the industries
that house their personal information.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unsettling to receive notice that one's personal information has been
stolen from the local "big box" store by a hacker, or to read about a massive
data breach in the newspaper and realize the breached insurance company is
one's carrier. It is bothersome to contact Amazon and Netflix to change
credit account information. But for most individuals whose basic personal
information has been compromised by a breach, empirical data suggests that
little to no real injury results.313 Still, victims should not be forgotten because
they lack the sophistication, or fail to take reasonable precautions to protect
their own data. These victims spend hours untangling the mess or lose pre-
cious money from their bank accounts. But using the sledgehammer of class
action lawsuits against the breached entity seems quite unnecessary in terms
of fairly and efficiently providing compensation to the individual victims of
the breach. By way of analogy, in the world of torts, it is black-letter law that
only "outrageous" conduct that causes extraordinary distress supports a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress; people are expected to endure
the "ordinary" slings and arrows shot by others, even if some emotional harm
is caused. Perhaps the same should be true for the "ordinary" breach by hack-
ing of the local retailer or insurance company.
Far more pressing as an objective than compensating individual victims,
it would seem, is stopping the hacking. Leaving aside the importance of se-
curing highly-classified national security information, one's personal data is
an expanding and increasingly rich target as more and more types of personal
data are collected (on wearable activity and performance enhancement de-
vices, home appliance monitors, and various apps for everything, to name but
a few). If not now, soon, it would seem, a data thief could truly steal a per-
312. Any equitable remedies incorporated in such agreements would, however, be
unavailable. These types of remedies would remain the province of regulatory
agencies, or would perhaps be voluntarily undertaken by the breached entity to
forestall the possibility of another costly breach. See, e.g., In re Heartland Pay-
ment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1049
(S.D. Tex. 2012).
313. This could change, of course: the next generation of hackers may devise new
ways to extract more from their ill-gotten data gains, and cause individual vic-
tims greater injury.
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son's identity, not just a name, address, and credit card number. If private
civil lawsuits based on the existing common law and consumer protection
statutory causes of action were an effective tool for achieving the goal of data
security, these claims should by all means be encouraged. But there are cer-
tainly good reasons to question whether this is so and to consider other ways
to ensure that the companies that collect our data take all necessary and rea-
sonable measures to protect that data from thieves.
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